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“Oh me, oh vita! Domande come queste mi perseguitano.
Infiniti cortei d’infedeli, città gremite di stolti,
che v’è di nuovo in tutto questo, oh me, oh vita!
Risposta:
Che tu sei qui, che la vita esiste e l’identità.
Che il potente spettacolo continua,
e che tu puoi contribuire con un verso.”
- Walt Whitman
Alla mia famiglia.

Introduzione
L’utilizzo di servizi di messaggistica su smartphone è incrementato in
maniera considerevole negli ultimi anni, complice la sempre maggiore disponi-
bilità di dispositivi mobile e l’evoluzione delle tecnologie di comunicazione via
Internet, fattori che hanno di fatto soppiantato l’uso dei classici SMS.
Tale incremento ha riguardato anche l’utilizzo in ambito business, un
contesto dove è più frequente lo scambio di informazioni confidenziali e quindi
la necessità di proteggere la comunicazione tra due o più persone. Ciò non
solo per un punto di vista di sicurezza, ma anche di privacy personale. I
maggiori player mondiali hanno risposto implementando misure di sicurezza
all’interno dei propri servizi, quali ad esempio la crittografia end-to-end e
regole sempre più stringenti sul trattamento dei dati personali.
In questa tesi andremo ad illustrare Messaging Layer Security, abbreviato
in MLS, un nuovo protocollo in fase di sviluppo che garantisce sicurezza ed
efficienza in conversazioni di gruppo. Se in una conversazione tra due client
la sicurezza può essere garantita tramite crittografia end-to-end e scambio
di chiavi, il problema sorge quando più attori partecipano alla conversazione
in modo asincrono: in questo caso lo sforzo computazionale è considerevole,
a maggior ragione considerando l’uso di dispositivi mobile con capacità di
batteria ridotta che lavorano in modo asincrono, non garantendo perciò la
presenza continua del dispositivo online.
Verrà trattata sia la parte architetturale, più generale e di indirizzo, che
la parte di protocollo, più tecnica e dettagliata. Infine verrà illustrata una
implementazione di MLS scritta in Rust e chiamata Melissa, che fornisce
tutte le funzionalità base previste dalla versione draft 05 del protocollo.
I lavori sul protocollo, tutt’ora in corso, sono portati avanti da un appos-
ito working group istituito presso l’Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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composto da ricercatori universitari ed aziendali. Melissa, invece, è portata
avanti da un apposito gruppo all’interno di Wire, servizio di messaggistica
sicuro orientato alle aziende.
Il presente elaborato di tesi nasce in seguito ad un’esperienza Erasmus
negli uffici di Wire a Berlino, continuata in questi ultimi mesi da remoto.
Avvertenza
Il presente elaborato di tesi si basa su una versione Internet-Draft non
definitiva delle specifiche di Messaging Layer Security. I contenuti riportati
potranno cambiare in futuro. Tutti gli aggiornamenti relativi a MLS sono
disponibili sul sito ufficiale https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks.
Introduction
The use of messaging services on smartphones has increased considerably
in recent years, due to the growth in the availability of mobile devices and
the evolution of communication technologies via Internet, factors that have
effectively replaced the use of text messages.
This increase also concerned the use in the business environment, a con-
text where the exchange of confidential information is more frequent and
therefore the need to protect communication between two or more people.
This is important not only on a security point of view, but also for per-
sonal privacy. The major global players have responded by implementing
security measures within their services, such as end-to-end encryption and
increasingly strict rules regarding the processing of personal data.
In this thesis we will illustrate Messaging Layer Security, shortened as
MLS, a new protocol under development that guarantees security and effi-
ciency in group conversations. When in a conversation between two clients,
security can be ensured through end-to-end encryption and key exchange.
The problem arises when multiple actors participate in the conversation asyn-
chronously: in this case the computational effort is considerable, even more
so considering the use of mobile devices with reduced battery capacity that
does not guarantee the continuous presence of the online device.
The thesis will deal with both the architectural part, that is more general
and traces the outline of the subject, and the protocol part, more techni-
cal and detailed. Finally, an implementation of MLS written in Rust and
called Melissa will be illustrated, which provides all the basic functionalities
indicated in the draft 05 version of the protocol.
Work on the protocol, still in progress, is carried out by a special working
group set up at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) composed of
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university and business researchers. Melissa, instead, is carried out by a
special group within Wire, a secure business-oriented messaging platform.
This thesis document follows an Erasmus experience in the Wire offices
in Berlin, which continued remotely in recent months.
Disclaimer
This thesis work is based on a non-definitive, Internet-Draft version of
Messaging Layer Security specifications. The contents shown may change in
the future. All updates about MLS are available on the official website
https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks.
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Chapter 1
Messaging and Security
1.1 Messaging
Messaging is a type of service that allow users to exchange information by
using different means of communication. In computer science, communica-
tion is intended to take place over an electronic channel. Types of information
may include texts, images, videos, voice notes, files, documents, audio and
video calls, and much more. Messaging applications include emails, chats, in-
stant messengers, messaging apps and SMS. Communication may take place
on computers, phones, tablets and smart devices.
In this document, we will consider the case of messaging services, includ-
ing instant messengers and messaging apps.
1.1.1 General use cases of messaging services
In general, messengers provide real-time text transmission service through
the Internet between two or more users. To achieve this, we need to specify
some fundamental properties of messaging.
Users who wish to exchange messages register to a messaging service using
personal credentials, which can be an email and password pair, a username
and password, a telephone number, a one-time password, etc. The messag-
ing service is responsible for keeping authentication information safe, or to
manage authentication through third-party services (e.g. Single Sign-On)
consistently.
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Users who join a messaging service are described by different information
about them. Typically, users must specify an identifier, which can be a
username, an email address, a person’s name or other types of identifier (e.g.
numeric or UUID). They can also be represented, optionally, by a picture or
avatar. Other information is generally defined based on the service and may
include, for example, the current status, job position, age, nickname, email
or phone number unless previously specified.
The user who enters a messaging service typically sees the list of open
conversations, known in instant messengers as buddy list. Depending on
the service, conversations may be with one person (one-on-one) or a group.
Group conversations may also be called in other ways, such as chats, chan-
nels or rooms, and they are usually distinguished by an identifier (a title or
nickname).
Users may typically initiate a one-on-one conversation by knowing the
identifier of the other person to contact or, if allowed by the service, by
searching inside a global directory. Users may place restrictions on how other
users are added, e.g. by sending a request or limiting to already authorized
users inside the buddy list. Users can create new conversations, or they can
be added to other conversations by other users, or by joining in other ways,
such as via an invitation link. Conversations may take place when both or
all users are online or not: therefore we talk about instant messaging in the
first case and asynchronous messaging in the latter.
Users of a conversation can view the history of messages and content
sent in that conversation since they joined it, in a chronological order, where
the last messages sent are usually displayed at the end of the list. Users
can participate in the conversation by writing inside the text field of the
conversation window. Based on the messaging service, they might also attach
emoticons/emojis, images, files, contacts, locations, stickers, surveys, etc.
Some messenger services also provide other advanced features, like audio
and video calls with one or more people, bots, ephemeral messages, integra-
tion with third-party services, admin control, etc.
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1.2 Evolution of messaging
Considering the above mentioned information, we can state that messag-
ing is nothing but the exchange of messages between two remote users. We
will now retrace the main steps that led to the current state of the industry.
1.2.1 Pre-Internet era (1960-1990)
In 1961, the MIT Computation Center developed the Compatible Time-
Sharing System (CTSS), one of the first time-sharing operating systems that
allowed multiple users to share resources over a single mainframe, the IBM
7094. This way, up to 30 simultaneous users were able to communicate by
storing files on an online disk. [18] Eight years later, CompuServe was in-
vented: it was the first commercial online service available in the United
States, a sort of predecessor of the World Wide Web. CompuServe was
known for its online chat and electronic mail service, message forums, soft-
ware libraries and online games. CompuServe also developed the Graphics
Interchange Format (GIF) that became popular in the 1990s, returned to the
fore in the second half of 2010s.
Shortly after, in 1971, the email service was invented by Ray Tomlinson.
His idea was to specify the destination of a message via the @, creating an
”address” now known as username@name of computer (e.g. john@example.com).
The idea of Tomlinson soon became adopted as the main network email
system of ARPANET. In 1985, Quantum Computer Services from Vienna
launched Quantum Link, an online service for Commodore 64 and 128 which
included chat rooms, email and instant messaging services.
Three years later the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol was invented.
IRC provides a group chat service where users can connect to channels, in
order to discuss about different topics. It is also possible to create one-on-
one conversations. IRC is still widely used nowadays: for example, it is the
principal instant communication channel of the Wikipedia community. In
1989, Quantum Link became America Online (AOL). AOL grew exponen-
tially during 1990s, becoming one of the largest internet providers in the
United States.
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1.2.2 Instant messengers (1990-2008)
In 1996, the Israeli company Mirabilis launched ICQ, one of the first
instant messenger totally dedicated to individual chats. ICQ became very
popular in a short amount of time. The following year, AOL launched AOL
Instant Messenger (AIM), an instant messenger based on the proprietary
OSCAR and TOC protocols. In 1998, AOL acquired ICQ, while Yahoo!
launched Yahoo! Messenger and, one year later, Microsoft released the first
version of MSN Messenger.
All these messaging services were united by a common characteristic: the
lack of interoperability. A first attempt to let these messengers communicate
with each other was brought on by Jabber in 1999, an open communica-
tion protocol known later as Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP). XMPP was used on a large scale by Google Talk, an instant mes-
saging and VoIP service platform by Google launched in 2005.
In 2003, Niklas Zennström and Janus Friis founded Skype, a revolutionary
telecommunication platform that provides encrypted instant messaging and
VoIP, originally built with an hybrid peer-to-peer and client-server architec-
ture.
1.2.3 Messaging apps (2008-current)
In 2008, Facebook launched Facebook Chat, a chat messaging service in-
tegrated into the Facebook platform, which later became a standalone app
called Facebook Messenger. In the same period, Twitter was launched, fea-
turing statuses with a maximum amount of 140 characters and a private
messaging service widely known as direct messages (DM), initially designed
for Twitter users who followed each other.
In November 2009, two former engineers from Yahoo - Brian Acton and
Jan Koum - developed the first version of WhatsApp, a messaging platform
for text and photos, and published it to the iOS App Store. It became really
popular and grew exponentially in a short amount of time. WhatsApp Inc.
was afterwards acquired by Facebook in 2014. During WWDC 2011, Apple
presented iMessage, a messaging service dedicated to the Apple platforms
and later supported on iOS, macOS and watchOS. The peculiarity is that it
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is integrated into the system and users can send free iMessages in the same
way they were used to sending SMS.
Google continued to invest in the messenger market with various solutions
over time, like Google Wave and Google Voice, which later became Google
Hangouts, and the Allo and Duo apps. In 2013, Nikolai and Pavel Durov,
Vkontakte co-founders, launched Telegram, a cloud-based messaging plat-
form with all the clients released open source. In the same period, interest
in messengers grew in East Asia with the Chinese solution WeChat and the
South Korean Line.
1.2.4 Business messengers
The popularity of messaging services has increased lately also on a busi-
ness level, as a communication tool for teams. Team chats can provide a
unique tool for communication within a company and, at the same time,
they can reduce the amount of emails exchanged between users. Some of
them include Skype for Business, Slack, Wire, Atlassian HipChat, Microsoft
Teams and Discord. They often include advanced features like conference
video calls, integrations, end-to-end encryption, admin tools, etc.
1.3 Security and privacy in communication
When dealing with private conversations, users expect from the messaging
services that what they write is kept private, in a way that eavesdropping and
interception should not be possible. This leads to the concepts of security
and privacy. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, privacy is someone’s
right to keep their personal matters and relationships secret. This concept
has evolved over time, switching from the right concerning the private sphere
of a subject, to the right of keeping personal data secret.
1.3.1 Cryptography
Cryptography is the study of techniques that can guarantee secure com-
munication in the presence of third parties called adversaries, preventing
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them to read private messages. Modern cryptography shares the same basic
concepts of computer security, namely:
• data confidentiality: protects the information from third parties,
guaranteeing access only to authorized parties;
• data integrity: attests the originality of data, that is, the data has
not been modified by third parties;
• authentication: guarantees the identity of the user within a commu-
nication;
• non-repudiation: impossibility of a party to dispute the authorship
of given data.
Cryptography is a horizontal discipline that is based on different fields
like computer science, mathematics, electrical engineering and physics, and it
is used in various instances of everyday life. Some of them include payment
cards, mobile communication, e-commerce and electronic communication,
digital signatures and certified electronic delivery services.
Cryptography is made of two fundamental operations: encryption and
decryption. Encryption is the transformation of a plain clear text into a
ciphertext using a cipher. Decryption is the inverse operation: given a ci-
phertext, using a cipher it is possible to decrypt text and transform it back
into plaintext. Ciphertexts are usually a sequence of scrambled and appar-
ently unreadable characters. A cipher is a system capable of transforming a
plain text into an unintelligible text.
There are two main ways to perform encryption: symmetric and asym-
metric encryption, also known as Public-Key Encryption.
Symmetric encryption
With symmetric encryption, a secret key is shared between sender and
receiver, and is used to encrypt plain texts and decrypt ciphertexts. A fun-
damental requirement for this approach is that the two parties must first
have exchanged the secret key in a secure fashion. In addition, the algorithm
must be strong enough not to allow a possible opponent to decipher the text.
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Figure 1.1: Symmetric Encryption. Source: [9]
Two possible ways to attack a symmetric encryption scheme are:
Cryptanalysis This approach relies on analysis brought on the content of a
ciphertext, encrypted through a key. Cryptoanalysis tries to deduce a
specific plaintext or the key used to encrypt it. If the attacker deducts
a key successfully, it is compromised.
Brute-force attacks This method tries every possible key on a ciphertext,
until an intelligible translation is obtained. On average, half of all
possible keys must be tried before achieving a successful result.
Public-key encryption
Asymmetric encryption, mostly known as Public-Key Encryption (PKE),
is a type of cryptography that makes use of a key pair for each party of a
communication. The public key is intended to be shared with third parties,
while the private key remains secret and kept by each of the two parties.
One key of the pair is used for encryption, while the other one is used for
decryption. Another important fact is that PKE is based on mathematical
algorithms, rather than operations on bit patterns. Public-Key Encryption
was first publicly proposed by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976.
Public-Key Encryption works as follows. Assuming that the two parties
are called Alice and Bob:
1. both Alice and Bob generate a key pair for encrypting and decrypting
messages;
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Figure 1.2: Asymmetric Encryption with Public Key. Source: [9]
2. both Alice and Bob place one of the two keys in a publicly accessi-
ble register; That is the Public Key, while the companion will be the
Private Key, which will be kept private;
3. when Bob wants to send a private message to Alice, Bob encrypts the
message using Alice’s public key;
4. when Alice receives the message, she decrypts it using her private key.
Other recipients cannot decrypt the message, because only Alice knows
her private key.
Figure 1.2 shows a message encrypted using Alice’s public key. This
approach guarantees confidentiality, while Figure 1.3 shows a message en-
crypted using Bob’s private key, providing authentication and data integrity.
1.3.2 End-to-End Encryption
End-to-End Encryption, shortened as E2EE, is a way to communicate
privately where the only parties who can read the messages are the ones
who are communicating. This is possible by encrypting and decrypting the
messages directly on clients of the authorized users. No one can decrypt data,
not even an attacker or the company who runs the service itself, without
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Figure 1.3: Asymmetric Encryption with Private Key. Source: [9]
having the private keys of the parties involved in the communication - that
should remain private. Keys can be agreed by using a pre-shared secret,
a one-time secret derived from the pre-shared one, or negotiating them by
using the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange method.
Internet
User A Device User B Device
"Hello"
qoxubrxk
xhsuiwof
dnzlaopa
qoxubrxk
xhsuiwof
dnzlaopa
qoxubrxk
xhsuiwof
dnzlaopa
"Hello"
Figure 1.4: Functioning of End-to-End Encryption. Inspired from https:
//oreil.ly/2IhYplf
Even if E2EE guarantees privacy in communication, there are some chal-
lenges that should be taken into account. One of them is the possibility of
Man-in-the-Middle attacks: rather than breaking the encryption, the sender
may try to impersonate a recipient, by sending the message encrypted with
their public key. A possible solution is to generate one-time strings based on
the public keys of the two parties. In parallel, some security issues linked
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to the device of the end user may arise. For example, a private key could
be stolen from a device during an attack; or the content of a communication
could be shared in other ways on a user’s device, like screenshots or chat
exports/backups. [20]
1.4 Secure messaging
We have seen that messengers exchange data between users, and encryp-
tion helps to hide such data from third unauthorized parties. With the
increase in the use of messaging services, the need to secure the communi-
cations has grown during the last years. This is mainly due to greater user
awareness on security issues, including data breaches and identity theft. In-
creased awareness has brought to the birth of secure messengers, designed
from scratch with security in mind like Signal, Wire and Threema, and the
implementation of end-to-end encryption to existing apps, like WhatsApp
did in 2016.
According to [19], some of the features of a secure messaging service
include:
• encryption of both texts and attachments that are exchanged;
• encryption of the content through a private key that stays on the device;
• implementation of Perfect Forward Secrecy, a property ensuring that,
even if long term keys get compromised, new session keys will remain
confidential;
• a recent audit by an independent company;
• a clearly documented service design;
• the type of cryptographic primitives used;
• availability of the code as open source for independent audits and re-
views;
• manually verified fingerprints;
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• impossibility to log, store and collect any plaintext message, metadata,
session or event.

Chapter 2
Messaging Layer Security
2.1 Background
Each messaging service is characterized by different architectures, features
and purposes. The path that led to the definition of Messaging Layer Security
passed through several different concepts and protocols.
2.1.1 Fundamental properties: Perfect Forward Secrecy
and Post-Compromise Security
Forward Secrecy Post-CompromiseSecurity
Time
Compromise
Figure 2.1: The temporal position of the two cryptographic properties of
MLS: Perfect Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromise Security.
As we can see from Figure 2.1, protection about secrecy of past and
future messages is guaranteed through two cryptographic properties: Perfect
Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromise Security.
Perfect Forward Secrecy (shortened as PFS) means that in a compromised
client, the secrecy properties - including access to all encrypted traffic history
and current keying material - are guaranteed for messages older than the
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oldest key of the client. Clients have an important role of deleting keys as
soon as they have been used with the expected message, otherwise secrecy is
considered weak.
Post-Compromise Security [6] (shortened as PCS) means that if a group
member is compromised at a certain time T , but it tries to perform an update
at a certain time T ′, with T ′ > T , then all secrecy guarantees are applied for
messages sent after T ′. For instance, if an adversary learns all secrets known
by Alice at T , and Alice wants to perform a key update at T ′, the adversary
is unable to violate the security properties after T ′.
2.1.2 PGP and OpenPGP
PGP, acronym for Pretty Good Privacy, is a family of cryptographic soft-
wares that uses a mix of symmetric-key cryptography, data compression,
hashing and public-key cryptography to provide cryptographic privacy and
authentication in online communication. It is used to encrypt and decrypt
texts, files, emails and whole disk partitions. Despite the fact that this pro-
tocol guarantees confidentiality, authentication and integrity check, it does
not provide Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromise Security. Furthermore,
it does not guarantee deniability.
PGP was initially released by Phil Zimmermann in 1991 as proprietary
software, but due to its rapid diffusion, in 1998 the specifications were col-
lected by IETF, which led to the development of PGP as an open protocol,
called OpenPGP.
2.1.3 Off-The-Record
Off-the-Record [13] is a cryptographic protocol designed by Ian Goldberg
and Nikita Borisov in 2004. It makes use of a ciphersuite composed by AES-
128 as symmetric-key algorithm, Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE), and
SHA-1 as hash function. OTR uses a symmetric approach, so the same
private key is used to both encrypt and decrypt a message. While this
protocol guarantees end-to-end encryption of messages, mutual authentica-
tion, Perfect Forward Secrecy and non-repudiation, it does not provide Post-
Compromise Security. Furthermore, the symmetrical nature of the algorithm
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involves the use of sessions, making it suitable for use on instant messengers,
but not on asynchronous messengers.
Moreover, one of the most important limitations of OTR is the fact that it
can only be used in conversations between two users. The use with multiple
clients was treated only in 2009, thanks to mpOTR, Multi-Party Off-The-
Record Messaging [14]. While it introduces some improvements, there are
other major pitfalls, like the lack of in-session Forward Secrecy, that was
originally provided by OTR.
2.1.4 Double Ratchet Algorithm
The main goal of the MLS protocol is to guarantee an efficient way to
manage multiple clients inside a group conversation. The current widespread
solution that works efficiently with two participants is the Double Ratchet
Algorithm [8]. Also referred to as Axolotl, Double Ratchet Algorithm is used
by two parties to exchange encrypted messages based on a shared secret key.
Developed in 2013 by Trevor Perrin and Moxie Marlinspike, it is the base of
the Signal Messaging Protocol [7] by Open Whisper Systems, whose core is
used right now by the most popular messaging platforms.
In a communication between two parties, new keys are derived for every
message using the Double Ratchet Algorithm. This way, earlier keys cannot
be calculated from the newest ones, thus ensuring Forward Secrecy. Diffie-
Hellman public values are also attached to the message by both parties,
so later keys cannot be calculated from the earlier ones, providing Post-
Compromise Security. These properties protect earlier or late messages in
case of a compromised key.
The cryptographic primitives used by the Double Ratchet Algorithm are:
• Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) with Curve25519 for the Diffie-
Hellman ratchet;
• Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) based on SHA-256
for message authentication codes;
• HMAC for the hash ratchet;
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• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for symmetric encryption.
Right now, Double Ratchet is implemented with two different approaches:
Client-side fan-out
In client-side fan-out, messages in a group conversation are sent directly
to the other clients. This way, assuming that N clients take part in a group
conversation, each client needs to send a message N times. Clients are re-
sponsible of maintaining updated keys for each participant.
This approach has been adopted by Signal, Wire (whose implementation
is called Proteus), Apple for iMessage and others.
Server-side fan-out (sender keys)
Another implementation based on the Signal Messaging Protocol is the
server-side fan-out, also known as sender keys, used for WhatsApp groups
and Facebook Messenger, and others. [17]
This is the same way as unencrypted messenger apps are implemented:
a client who wants to send a message in a group conversation, transmits a
single message to the server, which is then distributed N times by the server
to the N different clients. Messages in groups are build on pairwise encrypted
sessions, in order to achieve efficient server-side fan-out using sender keys.
2.2 The protocol
As we have seen, there are many secure messaging apps, which use similar
protocols but with different implementations. The challenges they are called
to solve are quite similar.
Messaging Layer Security, shortened as MLS, is a new security layer
intended to provide end-to-end encryption in group conversations. Messaging
services nowadays have to manage both one-on-one and group conversations:
it is therefore useful to think of a protocol suitable for group communication,
rather than point-to-point communication, in order to reduce the computa-
tional effort to encrypt and decrypt messages, and bandwidth required to
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send them. Furthermore, another major constraint is asynchronous com-
munication: services should be able to deliver messages, even if clients are
offline. MLS is meant to protect against eavesdropping, tampering, and mes-
sage forgery. The main goals of this protocol are:
• Groups: supporting large group conversations efficiently, theoretically
up to 50.000 members;
• Asynchronous: taking into account that clients may not be online
at the same time, including the worst-case scenario where none of the
members in a group are available;
• Security: managing group membership providing Forward Secrecy
and Post-Compromise Security with sub-linear scaling, instead of a
linear one.
• Formal verification: similar to Transport Layer Security (TLS) [5],
proving that the implementations satisfy the formal specification of the
protocol;
• Standardized: providing a standard protocol in order to make MLS
implementations interoperable with each other.
MLS is not intended to provide a full secure messaging protocol, but
rather to offer security measures for concrete protocols. In this regard, the
protocol does not specify a full, concrete implementation, but rather a set
of data structures that can be mapped onto concrete encodings like TLS.
Implementations that share common encodings could have a certain degree
of interoperability, but they might not be compatible because of different
authentication infrastructures.
The protocol is being designed by the MLS Working Group, a dedicated
working group at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The group has
already produced an MLS draft specification composed by two documents,
that will be analyzed in the following chapters:
• an architecture document [1] that sets the domain, the problems and
the requirements;
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• a protocol document [2] that specifies the protocol itself.
A third document is under development and will focus on federation [3],
describing the changes needed to allow different clients from the same or
different entities to communicate with each other, and how the client will
interact with the Delivery Service.
2.3 History
The history of this protocol is quite recent and still ongoing. It has its
roots in 2015, when an increasing number of companies and researchers began
to develop an interest in tree-based cryptographic schemes. The intention to
converge on a shared protocol for end-to-end encryption applied to messaging
arrived in 2016, from an informal meeting during the IETF 96 conference in
Berlin with people from Wire, Mozilla and Cisco.
In 2017, a paper by Facebook and the University of Oxford [4] introduced
the concept of Asynchronous Ratcheting Trees (ART). During the last months
of 2017, several workshops about MLS took place. The first informal meeting
of the MLS Working Group, also known as birds of a feather (BoF), took place
during the IETF 101 conference in February 2018 in London.
In May 2018, the MLS Working Group proposed TreeKEM [15], an al-
ternative to ART more cryptographically efficient and better at handling
concurrent changes, and they adopted it in the early drafts of the MLS pro-
tocol.
Right now, MLS is supported by several organizations like Mozilla, Face-
book, Wire, Cisco, MIT, University of Oxford, INRIA, Google and Twitter.
The protocol is still a work in progress: the specifications are in a state of
”Internet-Draft”, so they are informational documents and will be subject to
changes in the upcoming months.
2.4 Performances of MLS
MLS provides five different possible operations for a group conversation:
• create an empty conversation;
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• add a new client to an existing conversation;
• update of the client secrets;
• remove a client from a conversation;
• send a message inside a conversation.
Figure 2.2 shows a comparison in terms of computational complexity for
each of the operations previously described, between the two current solutions
based on the Double Ratchet Algorithm (client-side fan-out and server-side
fan-out) and the latest version of the MLS Protocol Draft.
O(N2)
O(N)
O(log n)
O(1)
(a)
Create a
conversation
(b)
Add client to a
conversation
(c)
Update client
secrets
(d)
Remove client
from a
conversation
(e)
Send a message
Client fanout MLS Draft 05Sender keys
Figure 2.2: Performance comparison of main actions, in terms of complexity,
between Client fanout, Sender keys and MLS Draft 05
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2.5 Current implementations
Companies that are part of the Working Group have started working on
some implementations of MLS, written in different programming languages
and based on different versions of the draft. Since MLS aims to become
an IETF Internet Standard, other companies outside of the Working Group
have started showing interest on the matter and are working on their own
implementations. A non exhaustive list, that may change over time, is the
following:
Melissa The proof of concept implementation carried out by the Wire team
and object of this thesis. It is written in Rust and publicly available at
https://github.com/wireapp/melissa. It is based on the draft 05
version of the protocol.
mlspp The draft implementation made by Cisco and written in C++. Avail-
able open source at https://github.com/cisco/mlspp.
MLS* This is an implementation written in F* by the Institut National de
Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (INRIA).
Molasses This is another early implementation written in Rust and based
on the draft 04 version of the protocol. It is carried out by Trail of Bits
and open sourced at https://github.com/trailofbits/molasses.
RefMLS An implementation written in JavaScript by the New York Uni-
versity in Paris.
Google Google is also working to an implementation written in C++.
Chapter 3
Messaging Layer Security
Architecture
The general architecture of Messaging Layer Security includes the speci-
fication of the general setting of the environment, the functional and security
requirements, and considerations. These concepts are treated at a higher
level than the protocol and they are described in [1]. While the protocol is
under development, the architecture is the basis of the entire specification,
therefore it is possible to affirm that it will not undergo great changes. We
will consider the version 02 of the document in this analysis.
3.1 General setting
3.1.1 Messaging Service
The base entity is the Messaging Service, shortened as MS. A Messaging
Service is a service that provides messaging features to users, that usually
have one or more devices, called clients. In a Messaging Service, users can
exchange messages in a one-on-one conversation or with other users in a
group conversation.
MLS calls members the set of participants of a Messaging Service and
consider one-on-one conversation as group conversations between two peo-
ple. This is the basic case, since conversations can have up to thousands of
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members. The Messaging Service consists of two services that allow clients
to send and receive messages correctly, as represented in Figure 3.1:
Group
Client n
User 1
Authentication
Service
Delivery 
Service
Client 0
User 0
Client 1
Figure 3.1: The general structure of a Messaging Service.
• an Authentication Service, shortened as AS, which is responsible
of maintaining user identities and to manage the authentication, ap-
proving or rejecting user access to the service. It is also responsible of
issuing credentials to new users and it could provide other services like
user discovery;
• a Delivery Service, shortened as DS, which is responsible to receive
and distribute messages to the group members. In group conversations,
DS may be responsible of broadcasting messages to all members of the
group. It also stores and delivers initial public keys that are required
by the clients to proceed with the establishment process of the group
secret key.
Both services may be maintained by the same entity or not. They are
logically independent: users may use a Delivery Service with an identity
issued by a third-party Authentication Service, like a Single Sign-On service.
A typical scenario of a messaging service may be the following:
3. Messaging Layer Security Architecture 23
1. Alice, Bob and Charlie create three different accounts in a Messaging
Service, obtaining credentials from the Authentication Service;
2. Alice, Bob and Charlie authenticate to the Delivery Service and store
some initial keying material, which can be used to send encrypted mes-
sages for the first time. Keying material is authenticated with their
long term credentials;
3. when Alice wants to send a message in the conversation, she contacts
the Delivery Service and looks up their initial keying material. These
keys are then used to create a new set of keys that she can use to
send encrypted messages to Bob and Charlie. In the end, she sends
encrypted messages to the DS, which forwards them to the recipients;
4. Bob and/or Charlie respond to Alice’s message. Their Update messages
trigger a new key derivation that allows the shared group key to be up-
dated. This is a required step, in order to guarantee Post-Compromise
Security.
Definitions
As we can see from Figure 3.1, a group is basically a set of two or more
users called members who can interact with the Messaging Service using one
or more clients.
A client is an end-user device designed to access a conversation through
an underlying platform, like web, desktop or mobile. Each client owns one
or more long-term identity key pairs that uniquely define their identities to
other clients in a group. Clients are able to create a group by inviting other
users, add or remove users from an existing group, join or leave groups, send
and receive messages from/to other members in a group.
A group is the set of clients that knows the shared group secret established
during the group key establishment. Multiple clients belonging to a user can
be grouped together, appearing as one virtual client to the rest of the group.
In MLS there is no single ”administrator” of a group: any client can add
other clients to a conversation. Restrictions can be enforced with access
control at the application layer.
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3.1.2 Authentication Service
The Authentication Service provides a map between user identities and
long-term identity keys. As mentioned in Chapter 1.1.1, a user identity can
be identified in several ways, like email address, username, phone number, or
a unique identifier. The Authentication Service has two main responsibilities:
it is the certification authority of the Messaging Service, which signs some
credentials that link an identity to a key. It is also the directory server that
provides keys for a given identity. On a security point of view, the connec-
tion with the Authentication Service might be secured through a transport
security protocol like TLS.
The Authentication Service has a great responsibility in ensuring the
authenticity of an identity. In fact, a malicious AS could impersonate any
user of the system. To avoid that, it is possible to publish the binding between
identities and keys in a public log, such as Key Transparency. While this is
not required by MLS, it is mandatory to avoid malicious attacks.
Key Transparency
Key Transparency is an open source library provided by Google [16]. It
is an application of a public log to help clients to build trust among them.
This happens by providing a public audit record of all changes happened
to data, including all the public keys of the actual recipients associated to
an account, the times an account was updated and who has updated it.
Everything happens preserving privacy.
3.1.3 Delivery Service
As with the Authentication Service, the Delivery Service also has multiple
responsibilities within a Messaging Service. It is the directory service for the
initial keys of the clients, allowing clients to establish a shared key and send
encrypted messages to another client, even if it is offline. Delivery Service is
also responsible of routing messages between clients and broadcasting them
to multiple clients.
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Key handling
Initial cryptographic keys are authenticated using the key of the client
and stored within the Delivery Service. These keys will be used in the next
steps to establish the shared group secret. Since a user may have multiple
clients, each with its own keying material, there might be multiple entries
stored by each user. Delivery Service is also responsible for allowing users to
manage their initial keys.
When a client wants to create a group and send an initial message, it
retrieves the initial keys from the Delivery Service, verifies them using the
identity key, and creates the group secret that can be used for message en-
cryption.
Content delivery
The architecture of MLS assumes that the Delivery Service provides:
• reliable delivery: a message sent to the Delivery Service should be
delivered to all clients, even if they are not currently available for de-
livery;
• in-order delivery: messages must be delivered in the same order as
they are received from a given client, and approximately in the same
order in which they are sent by clients - this might happen because
multiple clients can send messages at the same time;
• consistent ordering: the Delivery Service must ensure that all clients
have the same message ordering of operations that are relevant for
cryptography, while MLS provides causal consistency of the messages
for each sender. Otherwise, it might cause cryptographic errors.
Delivery Service may provide some kind of ordering information to ensure
that messages are delivered in the correct order. The protocol itself can verify
these properties by detecting inconsistencies in the order of messages, but it
does not provide mechanisms to recover from this situation.
Some forms of misbehavior in the Delivery Service could be possible and
difficult to detect. Without other side information, clients may not distin-
guish a Denial of Service attack.
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Membership
MLS is designed so that neither the Delivery Service nor the Authenti-
cation Service know which clients are inside which group. They still might
learn this information in different ways under a server-side fan-out model,
like traffic analysis or server-stored lists. In the first case, it might be pos-
sible to analyze which client has sent the same message to different clients.
In the latter, a group membership list could be stored in a server within the
Messaging Service.
In addition, since one of the major requirements of MLS is to work asyn-
chronously with online and offline clients, clients may still be holding old
keys. This is a problem with two other major constraints, Forward Secrecy
and Post-Compromise Security, because they rely on deletion and replace-
ment of keys. Right now, MLS does not provide any specification to solve
this problem, but systems that will implement the specification can enforce
some mechanism for doing so.
3.2 Requirements
As mentioned before, MLS is a group messaging protocol designed to
scale easily, from a group involving two up to approximately 50.000 clients,
hence maintaining good performance and safety for the users.
3.2.1 Functional requirements
Functional requirements include all the features needed in an MLS appli-
cation in order to exchange messages consistently. They are:
Asynchronous usage
All the operations made by clients in a group conversation, including
updating keys, adding or removing members, sending messages, should hap-
pen asynchronously, assuming that no other client is online simultaneously.
Clients do not wait for another reply from a user. The underlying transport
layer has to support asynchronous and reliable message delivery.
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Recovery after state loss
Participants in a group conversation whose local state is lost or corrupted
can reinitialize their state and continue to participate in the conversation
without being removed from the group.
Support for multiple devices
Users should be able to use multiple devices within the same Messaging
Service. New clients are added to a conversation using a previously shared
key secrets or a new key. They will not gain access to the previous history
of that conversation: history recovery is not allowed by MLS, but may be
implemented outside of the scope of this protocol.
Two alternatives regarding the management of devices are currently being
analyzed. The first one is treating every device as one participant occupying
a leaf in the tree, and then logically grouped as one member by the Mes-
saging Service. The second one is treating every member as one participant
occupying a leaf, pairing virtual devices to the member in some other way.
Extensibility
Messages not affecting the group state can carry an arbitrary payload in
any format (e.g. plaintext, JSON, binary, etc.) that can be consumed among
group members.
Privacy
Metadata might be subject to traffic analysis, especially if unprotected.
The protocol aims to reduce the metadata footprint on the server side. DS
persists just the data needed for message delivery, avoiding to carry any
personal information or other sensitive metadata. A Messaging Service that
controls both Authentication Service and Delivery Service cannot correlate
the delivered messages to the initial public keys.
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Federation
MLS aims to be compatible with federated environments: multiple imple-
mentations can interoperate to form federated systems, if they use compatible
message encodings. Federation is an interesting topic currently under analy-
sis by the MLS Working Group and treated in the MLS Federation document
[3] of the specifications.
Future compatibility
Multiple versions of the protocol should be able to coexist and cooperate
in the future. MLS offers a version negotiation mechanism that prevents
version downgrade attacks where an attacker would actively rewrite messages
with a lower protocol version than the one supported by the endpoints. When
multiple versions are available, negotiation guarantees that the version agreed
upon will be the highest version supported by the group. Negotiation is
usually performed during group creation by fetching the UserInitKeys and
checking the highest version number.
3.2.2 Security requirements
Security requirements include everything needed to ensure secrecy, au-
thentication and security of communication within a conversation. These
are:
Connections between client and servers
The protocol assumes that all transport connections are secured through
a security protocol in the transport layer, such as TLS. However, intrinsic
safety of MLS is still guaranteed in case the transport layer gets compromised.
Message secrecy and authentication
MLS provides secrecy, integrity and authentication for all messages. Se-
crecy means that a message can only be read by the participants of the group
conversation where the message is sent, even in the context of an active ad-
versary. Message integrity and authentication mean that clients can only
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accept messages if sent by a group member from a particular client, refusing
to accept messages sent as a different client.
Furthermore, Authentication Service and Delivery Service cannot read
messages sent between members of a group, because they are not part of the
group. MLS provides optional protections in order to avoid traffic analysis,
like messages padding. This way, all ciphertexts are of a standard length,
reducing the ability of adversaries to understand the length of messages.
Message content can be deniable if the signature keys are exchanged over a
deniable channel prior to signing messages.
Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromise Security
Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromised Security, as already mentioned
and explained, are two of the security requirements provided by MLS.
Message encryption keys are derived via a hash ratchet, which provides
a form of Forward Secrecy: learning a message key does not reveal previous
message or root keys.
Post-compromise security is provided by Update operations, in which a
new root key is generated from the latest ratcheting tree. If the adversary
cannot derive the updated root key after an Update operation, it cannot
compute any derived secrets. Keys are partially generated from the Update
message itself, as explained in Chapter 4.8.
Membership changes
Membership of a group in MLS is managed through agreement. This
means that all group members have to agree on the list of members. All
members are informed about addition or removal of other members. Once a
client is part of a group, the set of devices controlled by the user can only be
altered by an authorized member of the group. The authorization is managed
by the application, as well as Access Control Lists that allows addition or
removal of members to certain members. Members who are removed from
a group do not have particular privileges: compromise of a former group
participant does not affect the security of the messages sent after the removal,
but might affect previous messages if group secrets have not been deleted.
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Security of attachments
Security properties expected for attachments are similar to the ones ex-
pected from messages, except that the download time for attachments might
be way longer than that of messages. This means that, in the same way,
lifetime of cryptographic keys is higher than for messages, thus slightly weak-
ening the Post-Compromise Security guarantees for attachments.
Non-repudiation vs deniability
MLS provides strong authentication within a group. This means that a
group member cannot impersonate other members and send messages with
another identity. Furthermore, recipients are able to prove that a message
was sent by a given client, otherwise the user can report an abuse to the
Messaging Service. This verification is usually provided by a third party
(non-repudiation), but it should also be possible to operate in a deniable
mode where a proof is not possible. How to supply this is right now an open
issue on the protocol side.
3.3 Security considerations
MLS assumes that the attacker has a complete control of the network.
The protocol provides the security services in front of such attackers. These
guarantees have to degrade in presence of compromise of the transport secu-
rity links and/or clients and elements of the messaging system.
Delivery service compromise
MLS provides strong guarantees in case the Delivery Service gets com-
promised. Even if totally compromised, it should not be able to:
• read messages;
• inject messages that will be acceptable to legitimate clients;
• undetectably remove, reorder or replay messages.
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The Delivery Service can mount DoS attacks where it can refuse to for-
ward any messages or specific messages. DoS are partially detectable by
clients without an out-of-band channel. The Delivery Service could provide
stale keys as initial keys to the client. This does not lead to compromise of
the message stream, but it can attack forward security. The solution is to
set an expiration to the initial keys.
Authentication Service compromise
A compromised Authentication Service could provide incorrect or ad-
versarial identities to clients. This could be mitigated with some kind of
transparency/logging mechanism.
Client compromise
MLS provides limited protection against compromised clients. In that
case, an attacker is able to decrypt messages for groups which the client is a
member of and send messages impersonating the compromised client, unless
the client updates its keying material. Secrecy is guaranteed in the past and
in the future by Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromise Security, already
explained in Chapter 2.1.1.
In addition, a client cannot send a message to a group which appears to
be from another client with a different identity. Devices from the same user
that share keying material will be able to impersonate another device.

Chapter 4
Messaging Layer Security
Protocol
The protocol document [2] shows how MLS achieves the architectural
specification expressed before. We have seen two main cryptographic con-
straints of the protocol, Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromise Security. In
this section, we will see how they are guaranteed in MLS and the way all
requirements take shape. This protocol part is based on the draft version 05.
4.1 The basics of MLS
MLS is based on the work brought on Asynchronous Ratcheting Trees
already discussed and explained in [4]. ART has been replaced by TreeKEM
[15], a more efficient solution that better handles concurrent changes and
tree scaling. Double Ratchet is not efficient for use with bigger groups over
networks with low bandwidth.
In fact, for groups with two or more clients, a common strategy is to
broadcast symmetric sender keys over shared symmetric channels. Then,
each client can send messages in the group with their own sender key. While
this can provide Forward Secrecy, it makes it difficult to achieve Post-Compromise
Security. An adversary who learns a sender key could potentially eavesdrop
messages sent from a member. Generating new sender keys is a solution, but
it requires a high computation cost that scales linearly with the group size.
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The protocol expects the Messaging Service to provide a long term iden-
tity key provider - the Authentication Service, a broadcast channel for each
group that will relay messages to all clients, and a directory where clients can
publish and get initial keys. The information stored by each client includes
both private and public data, and it is called state.
The protocol describes four major operations - that are the main opera-
tions for group chats:
• initialization;
• adding a member;
• updating member’s secret;
• removing a member.
4.1.1 Initialization and member addition
An initial state is set up by the group creator with the Init message and it
is based on information pre-published by clients inside the directory. When
exchanging messages, clients produce new shared states that are linked to
the predecessors, forming a Direct Acyclic Graph (DAG).
A
UserInitKeyA
B C Directory GroupChannel
UserInitKeyB 
UserInitKeyC
Figure 4.1: Pre-initializing phase: each client publishes a UserInitKey inside
the directory.
As we can see from Figure 4.1, before the initialization of a group, each
client publish its UserInitKey inside the directory of the Messaging Service.
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Figure 4.2: Initialization of a group conversation in MLS.
Any client A who wants to create a group with other clients B and C,
needs to download the UserInitKeys of both clients from the directory (1).
After that, it creates an empty state within itself and uses the UserInitKeys
to compute the Add and Welcome messages for B and C. Add messages
are used to indicate that a new user has been added to the group, while
Welcome messages are intended to inform the new user that they are added
to the group and can start sending messages (2). The procedure is repeated
for every new group member (3) and is graphically described in Figure 4.2.
Clients cannot get back in time before being added to the group, because
new secrets are generated at every new epoch.
4.1.2 Periodic updates
In order to provide Forward Secrecy and Post-Compromise Security, each
member periodically updates their leaf secret, which represents a contribution
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to the group secret.
Any member willing to update their secret can do so by generating a new
leaf secret and send an Update message, as we can see from Figure 4.3. Once
all members have processed the message, the group secrets will be unknown
to attackers. The decision about the refresh interval for updates are up to
the application.
A B Z Directory GroupChannel
Update(A)
state.update(A)
state.update(A)
state.update(A) Update(A)
...
Figure 4.3: Periodic update of secret keys.
4.1.3 Removing a member
Members are removed in a similar way, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Any
member can generate a Remove message regarding another user (e.g. user A
who wants to remove user B) that can be consumed from other participants -
except by the removed user - to update their internal state. This will trigger
an update of the secrets that will not be delivered to the removed user, so
they will not be able to send new messages to the group.
4.2 The logic behind MLS: Ratchet Trees
MLS makes use of Ratchet Trees [4] to derive shared secrets between
multiple clients. Ratchet Trees are left-balanced binary trees: this means
that every node of the tree except leaves has two children - left and right. In
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A B Z Directory GroupChannel
Remove(B)
state.delete(B)
state.delete(B) Remove(B)
...
Figure 4.4: Removing a member from a group.
addition to the peculiarities of this type of trees, Ratchet Trees inherit all
the relational properties of a normal tree.
A tree can have multiple subtrees, that is, a part of the tree given by the
descendants of a node, which becomes the head of the subtree. The size of a
tree is the number of leaf nodes it contains.
A tree can be considered left-balanced if, for every parent, the subtree
is fully balanced or the largest full subtree is the one positioned on the left
side. This means that the left subtree is always the one that fills before. A
tree is fully balanced when its size is a power of two and both right and left
subtrees have the same size.
The direct path of a node is the concatenation of the node with the direct
path of its parent. The copath is the list of siblings of a node in its direct
path. The frontier is the list of heads of the maximal full subtrees of the
trees, ordered from left to right.
Each node has a node index, starting at zero and running from left to
right, as we can see from Figure 4.5. Since protocol messages only need to
refer to the leaves of the tree, they are indexed with a proper index called
leaf index, always numbered from left to right. Given this numbering, leaf
indices are always half of the respective node index, and leaf nodes always
have an even node index.
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A B C D E F G
H I J
K L
M
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Node Indices
Leaf Indices0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 4.5: A left-balanced tree, with node and leaf indices. Direct path is
C, I,K and is marked with black nodes, copath is H,D,L and is marked in
gray and frontier is K,L,G and is marked with a red, bolder line on involved
nodes.
4.2.1 Ratchet Tree nodes
Ratchet Trees are used to generate shared group secrets. A particular
instance of a Ratchet Tree is based on these cryptographic primitives:
• a Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) ciphersuite, which specifies a
Key Encapsulation Method (KEM), an AEAD encryption scheme, and
a hash function;
• a Derive-Key-Pair function that produces an asymmetric key pair from
a symmetric node secret.
Each node of a ratchet tree contains up to three values:
• a private key, within direct paths;
• a public key;
• a credential, in leaf nodes.
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4.2.2 Blank nodes and resolution
A Ratchet Tree node may be blank: this means that no value is present in
that node. The resolution of that node is an ordered list of non-blank nodes
that cover all non-blank descendants. Nodes are ordered according to their
indices. The three possible cases of resolution of a node X are:
• non-blank node: res(X) = {X};
• blank leaf node: res(X) = {};
• blank intermediate node: res(X) = {res(left(X)), res(right(X))}
A C D
CD
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 4.6: A binary tree with some blank nodes (1, 2 and 3).
In the example shown in Figure 4.6, we can see that:
• res(5) = {C,D}
• res(2) = {}
• res(3) = {A,CD}
Every node, including blank nodes, contains a hash that summarizes the
content of the subtree below that node.
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4.2.3 View of a Ratchet Tree
MLS assumes that each participant has a complete and up-to-date view
of the public state of the group ratchet tree, including public keys and cre-
dentials of the leaf nodes. Instead, the secret state is known only to the leaf
nodes, which represent the members of the group. This way, no participant
in a group has full knowledge of the secret state of the tree - including private
keys.
MLS maintains the member views of the tree in a way to maintain the
tree invariant. The private key for a node is known to a member of the group
only if their leaf is a descendant or equal to the node. This way, each member
knows the private keys only for nodes in its direct path.
4.2.4 Ratchet Tree updates
The contents of a parent node are based on the latest updated child and
are computed from one of its children:
Listing 4.1: Contents of a parent node computed from childrens
path_secret[n] = HKDF-Expand-Label(path_secret[n-1], "path", "",
Hash.Length)
node_secret[n] = HKDF-Expand-Label(path_secret[n], "node", "", Hash
.Length)
node_priv[n], node_pub[n] = Derive-Key-Pair(node_secret[n])
As we can see from Figure 4.7, if participants join a group with leaf
secrets A, B, C and D in this order, the resulting tree will have KDF (D)
as parent of C and D and, in turn, its parent will be KDF (KDF (D)) (a).
If the second participant changes its leaf secret to X, the parent secrets will
change according to this update (b).
4.2.5 Tree view synchronization
Members of a group have to keep their view of the tree synchronized and
up to date. When adding or removing clients, an handshake message con-
taining public values for intermediate nodes in the direct path is transmitted.
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A B C D
KDF(B) KDF(D)
KDF(KDF(D))
A X C D
KDF(X) KDF(D)
KDF(KDF(X))
(a) (b)
Figure 4.7: An example of leaf secrets update.
Other members can use these public values to update their view of the tree.
The member that proposes an update broadcasts a set of values along the
direct path of a leaf, as well as the root. These values are the public key of
the node and zero or more encrypted copies of the path secret corresponding
to the node. Other members can use these nodes of the direct path to update
their own view of the tree.
The path secret value is encrypted for the subtree corresponding to the
non-updated child of the parent. There is one encrypted path secret for each
public key in the resolution of the non-updated child.
The recipient of an update processes it through the following steps:
• Compute the updated path secrets
1. identify a node in the direct path for which the local member is
in the subtree of the non-updated child;
2. identify a node in the resolution of the copath node for which this
node has a private key;
3. decrypt the path secret for the parent of the copath node using
the private key from the resolution node;
4. derive secret values for ancestors ofthat node using the algorithm
described above;
5. recipient should verify that the received public keys agree with
the ones derived from the new node secret values;
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• Merge the updated path secrets into the tree
1. replace the public keys for nodes on the direct path with the re-
ceived public keys;
2. for nodes where an updated secret was computed in step 1, replace
the secret value for the node with the updated value.
As we can see from Figure 4.7, giving pk(X) the public key of X and
E(K,S) the public-key encryption with public key of K of the secret value
S, when an update is made along the direct path B − E −G, the following
values will be transmitted by the sender:
• for pk(G), ciphertexts E(pk(C), G), E(pk(D), G)
• for pk(E), ciphertext E(pk(A), E)
• for pk(B): {}
4.3 Ciphersuites
MLS sessions use a single ciphersuite that specifies the following primi-
tives:
• a hash function;
• a Diffie-Hellman finite-field group or elliptic curve;
• an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) encryption
algorithm, as described in [10];
• a Derive-Key-Pair (DKP) algorithm that maps octets with the same
length as the output of the hash function to key pairs for the asym-
metric encryption scheme.
Public keys are opaque values in a format defined by the ciphersuite. The
two types used are HPKEPublicKey and SignaturePublicKey.
Implementations may use one of the two ciphersuites supported by MLS
and described below. More ciphersuites will be supported in the future.
Ciphersuites and signature schemes are defined as follow:
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Listing 4.2: Definition of SignatureScheme and CipherSuite
1 enum {
2 ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256(0x0403),
3 ed25519(0x0807),
4 (0xFFFF)
5 } SignatureScheme;
6
7 enum {
8 P256_SHA256_AES128GCM(0x0000),
9 X25519_SHA256_AES128GCM(0x0001),
10 (0xFFFF)
11 } CipherSuite;
4.3.1 Curve25519, SHA-256 and AES-128-GCM
This ciphersuite uses Curve25519 as Diffie-Hellman group, SHA-256 as
hash function and AES-128-GCM as AEAD algorithm. Given an octet X,
the private key produced by the DKP operation is SHA-256(X). The public
key is X25519(SHA-256(X), 9).
Curve25519 is an elliptic curve offering 128 bits of security. It is designed
for use with Diffie-Hellman Elliptic Curve key agreement scheme (ECDH)
and it is one of the fastest elliptical curve cryptographies not covered by
patents. The DH function name is X25519. The curve used by Curve25519
is y2 = x3 + 486662x2 + x, a Montgomery curve, over the prime field defined
by 2255 − 19 and using x = 9 as base point.
SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm-256) is a revision of the SHA-1 algo-
rithm that was originally developed by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) in 1993. While the algorithm is pretty similar to
SHA-1, this revision mainly differs for the message digest size - 256 bits
instead of 160 - and the number of steps needed - 64 instead of 80. [9]
AES-128-GCM is a cipher block algorithm developed by Vincent Rijmen
and Joan Daemen, adopted by NIST and intended to replace the old DES
and Triple DES algorithms. It is based on a block length of 128 bits and a key
length of 128, 192 or 256 bits. It is combined with GCM, the Galois/Counter
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Figure 4.8: Curve25519 elliptic curve
Mode of Operation for cryptographic block ciphers.
4.3.2 P-256, SHA-256 and AES-128-GCM
This ciphersuite differs from the previous one for the usage of P-256 as
Diffie-Hellman group. Given an octet X, the private key derived by DKP is
SHA-256(X) interpreted as a big-endian integer. The public key is the result
of multiplying the P-256 base point by this integer.
P-256 is a widely used curve offering 128 bits of security developed by
NIST. The curve is described by the function y2 = x3−3x+4105836372515214
2129326129780047268409114441015993725554835256314039467401291, with
modulo p = 2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1. According to [23], P-256 is not
considered safe, due to some lacks on the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP). ECDLP is the problem of finding an ECC user’s secret
key, given the user’s public key.
4.4 Credentials
A group member authenticates the identities of other participants with
credentials issued by an authentication system. Any credential must express:
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• the public key of a signature key pair;
• the identity of the private key holder;
• the signature scheme used by the holder to sign MLS messages;
• some kind of information that allows a party to verify identities (op-
tional).
Listing 4.3: Definition of CredentialType, BasicCredential and Credential
types.
1 enum {
2 basic(0),
3 x509(1),
4 (255)
5 } CredentialType;
6
7 struct {
8 opaque identity<0..2^16-1>;
9 SignatureScheme algorithm;
10 SignaturePublicKey public_key;
11 } BasicCredential;
12
13 struct {
14 CredentialType credential_type;
15 select (credential_type) {
16 case basic:
17 BasicCredential;
18 case x509:
19 opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
20 };
21 } Credential;
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4.5 Tree hashes
Group members can agree on the cryptographic state of the group by
generating a hash value that represents the contents of the group ratchet
tree and the member’s credentials. The hash of the tree is the hash of its
root node, defined recursively from the leaves. The hash of a leaf is the hash
of the LeafNodeHashInput object. At the same time, the hash of a parent
node including the root, is the hash of a ParentNodeHashInput object.
Listing 4.4: Definition of LeafNodeInfo, LeafNodeHashInput and ParentN-
odeHashInput types.
1 struct {
2 HPKEPublicKey public_key;
3 Credential credential;
4 } LeafNodeInfo;
5
6 struct {
7 uint8 hash_type = 0;
8 optional<LeafNodeInfo> info;
9 } LeafNodeHashInput;
10
11 struct {
12 uint8 hash_type = 1;
13 optional<HPKEPublicKey> public_key;
14 opaque left_hash<0..255>;
15 opaque right_hash<0..255>;
16 } ParentNodeHashInput
Within LeafNodeHashInput, the public key and credential fields rep-
resent the leaf public key and the credential for the member of that leaf.
info is null when the leaf is blank.
For ParentNodeHashInput, left hash and right hash fields hold the
hashes for the left and right children. public key holds the hash of the
public key stored in the node, which is null if the node is blank.
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4.6 Group state
Each member of the group maintains a representation of the state of the
group, that is updated after any operation made by other group participants.
The state is composed by these fields:
• group id: an unique identifier of the group. Once instantiated, it never
changes;
• epoch: the current version of the group key. It is incremented by one
for each GroupOperation processed;
• tree hash: contains a commitment to the contents of the group ratchet
tree and the credentials for the group members, as expressed in Chapter
4.5. The hash is updated to represent the current tree and credentials;
• transcript hash: contains the list of GroupOperation that led to this
state. It is updated as follows:
transcript hash [n] = Hash(transcript hash [n-1] ||
operation)
When a new one-member group is created, this field is set to an all-zero
vector of length equal to Hash.length.
4.7 Direct paths
Each MLS message needs to transmit node values along the direct path
of a leaf. The path contains a public key for the leaf node, and a public
key and encrypted secret value for intermediate nodes in the path. Path is
ordered from the leaf to the root.
Listing 4.5: Definition of HPKECiphertext, RatchetNode and DirectPath
types.
1 struct {
2 HPKEPublicKey ephemeral_key;
3 opaque ciphertext<0..2^16-1>;
4 } HPKECiphertext;
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5
6 struct {
7 HPKEPublicKey public_key;
8 HPKECiphertext encrypted_path_secrets<0..2^16-1>;
9 } DirectPathNode;
10
11 struct {
12 DirectPathNode nodes<0..2^16-1>;
13 } DirectPath;
The length of the secrets is zero for the first node in the path, and equal to
the length of the resolution of the corresponding copath node for the remain-
ing elements. HPKECiphertext values are computed according to Hybrid
Public Key Encryption. [11]
Decryption is performed in the corresponding way, using the private key of
the resolution node and the ephemeral public key transmitted in the message.
4.8 Key schedule
Group keys are derived using HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Deriva-
tion Function (HKDF) [12]. The hash function used by HKDF is the cipher-
suite hash algorithm. Figure 4.9 explains the functioning of the key schedule.
Each Epoch Secret is combined by the Extract function of HKDF, which
takes the Update Secret of the current epoch as argument and it is salted
using the Init Secret from the previous epoch.
The Application Secret, the Confirmation Key and the next Init Secret
take the secret argument from the incoming arrow of the diagram, along with
the GroupState of the current epoch, to derive new epoch secrets.
4.8.1 Encryption keys
MLS encrypts three types of information: metadata about the sender,
handshake messages and application messages. Metadata used to lookup the
key for encryption is encrypted under AEAD with a random nonce and the
sender data key derived from the sender data secret:
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Init Secret [n-1]
Epoch Secret [n]Update Secret [n]
Application Secret [n]
Confirmation Key [n]
Init Secret [n]
Sender Data Secret [n]
Handshake Secret [n]
Figure 4.9: Functioning of key schedule
1 sender_data_key =
2 HKDF-Expand-Label(sender_data_secret, "sd key", "", key_length)
Handshake messages are encrypted using a key and a nonce derived from
the handshake secret for a specific sender, in order to prevent multiple
senders to perform this way:
1 handshake_nonce_[sender] =
2 HKDF-Expand-Label(handshake_secret, "hs nonce", [sender],
nonce_length)
3
4 handshake_key_[sender] =
5 HKDF-Expand-Label(handshake_secret, "hs key", [sender], key_length)
For application messages, a chain of keys is derived for each sender in a
similar way. This allows Forward Secrecy on these messages within and out
of an epoch. A step of this chain is called generation.
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Application Secret
Sender [n-1]
Nonce [n-1]
Key [n-1]
Application Secret
Sender [n]
Application Secret
Application Sender
Application Secret
Sender [0]
...
Figure 4.10: Application Key Schedule
The sender values are the indices of the member that will use the key to
send the message.
Usage of secrets
In order to provide Forward Secrecy at the level of Application messages,
senders must use a given secret once and increment the generation of their
secret. This way, an attacker that gets an Application Secret at epoch n+ 1
will not be able to derive the Application Secret at epoch n, nor the associated
AEAD key and nonce.
Receivers must delete an Application Secret once it has been used to
derive the AEAD key and nonce, as well as the next Application Secret.
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Receivers may keep the AEAD key and nonce for a reasonable period, but
they must delete keys and nonces once they have been used to successfully
decrypt a message.
4.9 Initialization keys
MLS provides the possibility for users to publish initialization keys that
provide some information about the user. This is useful as it allows users to
add clients asynchronously to a conversation, even if they are offline. This
operation is performed using the UserInitKey messages.
UserInitKeys specify the ciphersuites supported by the client and pro-
vide the public keys that can be used for key derivation and signing. The
identity key of the client should be stable throughout the lifetime of the
group. Initialization keys should be used only for a limited number of times
- potentially once. These keys also contain an identifier chosen by the client,
which the client must assure that uniquely identifies a given UserInitKey
object among the set of keys created by the client.
The init keys array has the same length of the cipher suites array.
Each entry inside init keys array must be a public key for the asymmet-
ric encryption scheme defined in the cipher suites array and used in the
HPKE construction for TreeKEM. The UserInitKey structure is then signed
using the identity key of the client. A structure using an invalid signature
is considered malformed. The signature process includes all the fields except
for the signature field.
Listing 4.6: Definition of UserInitKey
1 uint8 ProtocolVersion;
2
3 struct {
4 opaque user_init_key_id<0..255>;
5 ProtocolVersion supported_versions<0..255>;
6 CipherSuite cipher_suites<0..255>;
7 HPKEPublicKey init_keys<1..2^16-1>;
8 Credential credential;
9 opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
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10 } UserInitKey;
4.10 Message framing
Handshake and application messages share the same framing structure
that provides encryption, in order to assure confidentiality, and signing to
authenticate the sender within the group.
The structures involved are MLSPlaintext and MLSCiphertext. The first
one is a plaintext message that is only signed, while the latter is both signed
and encrypted, with protection on the content of the message and related
metadata. MLSCiphertext should be used for application and handshake
messages; in case the delivery service needs to examine handshake messages,
they might be transmitted as MLSPlaintext.
Listing 4.7: Definition of ContentType enumerator and MLSPlaintext and
MLSCiphertext objects
1 enum {
2 invalid(0),
3 handshake(1),
4 application(2),
5 (255)
6 } ContentType;
7
8 struct {
9 opaque group_id<0..255>;
10 uint32 epoch;
11 uint32 sender;
12 ContentType content_type;
13
14 select (MLSPlaintext.content_type) {
15 case handshake:
16 GroupOperation operation;
17
18 case application:
19 opaque application_data<0..2^32-1>;
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20 }
21
22 opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
23 } MLSPlaintext;
24
25 struct {
26 opaque group_id<0..255>;
27 uint32 epoch;
28 ContentType content_type;
29 opaque sender_data_nonce<0..255>;
30 opaque encrypted_sender_data<0..255>;
31 opaque ciphertext<0..2^32-1>;
32 } MLSCiphertext;
The signature can be computed this way:
• gathering the required metadata: group identifier, epoch, content type
(copied from the MLSPlaintext object), nonce, sender index, and key
generation;
• signing the protected content and metadata;
• encrypting the sender information, using the random nonce and the
key derived by the sender data secret;
• encrypting the content through a content encryption key.
The ciphertext field of MLSCiphertext is populated during the content
encryption process, while the encrypted sender data is populated during
the content metadata step. Decryption is made in a reverse manner, so first
it decrypts metadata, the message, and then verifies the content signature.
4.10.1 Metadata encryption
The sender data used for content encryption is encrypted through AEAD
using the sender data nonce and sender data key fields of MLSCiphertext,
and encoded into the MLSSenderData object. Additional authenticated data
(AAD) are handled through MLSCiphertextSenderDataAAD. Both structures
54 4. Messaging Layer Security Protocol
are described in Listing 4.8. The Delivery Service cannot detect the sender
of the message, since sender is encrypted inside MLSSenderData.
When parsing sender data during decryption, the recipients have to verify
that the sender field is an occupied leaf in the ratchet tree. To do so, the
index value must be lesser than the number of leaves of the tree.
Listing 4.8: Definition of MLSSenderData and MLSCiphertextSender-
DataAAD objects
1 struct {
2 uint32 sender;
3 uint32 generation;
4 } MLSSenderData;
5
6 struct {
7 opaque group_id<0..255>;
8 uint32 epoch;
9 ContentType content_type;
10 opaque sender_data_nonce<0..255>;
11 } MLSCiphertextSenderDataAAD;
4.10.2 Content signing and encryption
MLSPlaintext objects are signed using the signing private key corre-
sponding to the credentials of the sender at the leaf in the tree. The signature
includes metadata and message content without the signature field.
The ciphertext field of the MLSCiphertext object is produced by sup-
plying the inputs specified in Listing 4.9 to the AEAD function provided by
the ciphersuite in use. The plaintext input contains content and signature of
the MLSPlaintext object, with an optional padding.
Keys and nonces vary depending on the content type of the message. The
handshake key can be chosen from the application key chain for the current
epoch, according to the message type.
Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) used during encryption include
the value specified inside MLSCiphertextContentAAD. They are used to iden-
tify the key and nonce.
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The ciphertext of MLSCiphertext is produced by supplying AAD to
the AEAD function.
Listing 4.9: Definition of MLSCiphertextContent and MLSCiphertextCon-
tentAAD objects
1
2 struct {
3 opaque content[length_of_content];
4 uint8 signature[MLSInnerPlaintext.sig_len];
5 uint16 sig_len;
6 uint8 marker = 1;
7 uint8 zero_padding[length_of_padding];
8 } MLSCiphertextContent;
9
10 struct {
11 opaque group_id<0..255>;
12 uint32 epoch;
13 ContentType content_type;
14 opaque sender_data_nonce<0..255>;
15 opaque encrypted_sender_data<0..255>;
16 } MLSCiphertextContentAAD;
4.11 Handshake messages
As mentioned before, the group state will change after one of the following
four basic operations:
• group initialization;
• client addition;
• client removal;
• client update of the leaf key.
These operations are performed by broadcasting handshake messages to
the group. There is not a consolidated handshake phase to the protocol, be-
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cause these broadcast messages are exchanged throughout the entire lifetime
of the group, when a client needs to inform the whole group about changes.
Handshake messages encapsulate a GroupOperation message that per-
forms the change to the group state. The handshake is carried in a MLSPlaintext
that provides the signature of the sender, or in a MLSCiphertext if the ap-
plication wants to send it encrypted.
Listing 4.10: Definition of GroupOperationType, GroupOperation and Hand-
shake types.
1 enum {
2 init(0),
3 add(1),
4 update(2),
5 remove(3),
6 (255)
7 } GroupOperationType;
8
9 struct {
10 GroupOperationType msg_type;
11 select (GroupOperation.msg_type) {
12 case init: Init;
13 case add: Add;
14 case update: Update;
15 case remove: Remove;
16 };
17 opaque confirmation<0..255>;
18 } GroupOperation;
The general flow for processing a handshake message is as follows:
1. if the handshake is encrypted in a MLSCiphertext, decrypt it;
2. verify that the epoch field of the MLSPlaintext is equal to the epoch
of the current GroupState object;
3. verify that the signature of the MLSPlaintext is verified using the pub-
lic key from the credential stored at the leaf indicated by the sender
field;
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4. use the operation message to produce an updated and provisional
GroupState object incorporating the changes;
5. use the confirmation key for the new epoch to compute the confir-
mation MAC for this message and verify that it is the same as the
confirmation field;
6. if the above checks are successful, consider the updated GroupState as
the current state of the group.
The signature and confirmation values are computed over the tran-
script of group operations, using the transcript hash from the provisional
GroupState object:
1 GroupOperation.confirmation = HMAC(confirmation_key, GroupState.
transcript_hash)
HMAC uses the Hash algorithm for the ciphersuite in use. Sign uses the
signature algorithm indicated by the signer’s credential in the roster.
4.11.1 Init
Direct initialization messages are currently undefined in draft 04 and 05.
The actual workaround is to create a group state including only the client
that creates the group, and then add the initial members to the group. This
has a communication complexity of O(N log N), rather than O(N) of the
direct initialization.
4.11.2 Add
When adding a new member to a group, an existing member should send
a Welcome message to the new member and an Add message to the group.
Welcome message
The Welcome message specifies that the new member needs to initialize
a GroupState object that can be updated to the current state using the Add
message, encrypted to the new member using HPKE. The recipient key pair
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for the HPKE encryption is the one included in the indicated UserInitKey,
corresponding to the related ciphersuite.
Listing 4.11: Definition of RatchetNode and WelcomeInfo structures and
Welcome message.
1 struct {
2 HPKEPublicKey public_key;
3 optional<Credential> credential;
4 } RatchetNode;
5
6 struct {
7 ProtocolVersion version;
8 opaque group_id<0..255>;
9 uint32 epoch;
10 optional<HPKEPublicKey> tree<1..2^32-1>;
11 opaque transcript_hash<0..255>;
12 opaque init_secret<0..255>;
13 } WelcomeInfo;
14
15 struct {
16 opaque user_init_key_id<0..255>;
17 CipherSuite cipher_suite;
18 HPKECiphertext encrypted_welcome_info;
19 } Welcome;
When describing a tree through a list of nodes, credential for a node
must be populated only if that node is a leaf in the tree.
The init secret of the Welcome message is the output of Figure 4.9.
The new member can combine the Init secret with the Update secret trans-
mitted in the corresponding Add message to get the epoch secret in which it
is added. Prior epoch secrets are never revealed to new members.
The new member process the Add message for itself, so the Welcome
message should reflect the state of the group before the new user is added.
The Welcome message will contain a copy of the GroupState object owned
by the sender.
In a conversation with Alice and Bob, Bob can decrypt a Welcome mes-
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sage, but he does not have the cryptographic assurance that Alice is the
real sender. For each Update message, participating clients contribute to the
signing, this way authenticating the path in the tree. If the chain is included
in the Welcome message, Bob can ensure that Alice is not lying by verifying
that other members have signed the inner nodes as well.
Add message
The Add message provides the information needed by the existing group
members in order to update their GroupState with the new member:
Listing 4.12: Definition of Add message.
1 struct {
2 uint32 index;
3 UserInitKey init_key;
4 opaque welcome_info_hash<0..255>;
5 } Add;
The index field specifies where in the tree the new member should be
added: into an existing blank node, or at the right edge of the tree.
In both cases, the index i should be strictly comprised between 0 and the
size of the group (0 ≤ i ≤ n). When i = n, the node is added at the right
edge. If the index already exists (i < n) and the node is not blank, then
it means that the Add message is malformed and should be rejected by the
recipient.
The welcome info hash field contains a hash of the WelcomeInfo object.
The message is generated by requesting the UserInitKey for the user to be
added from the directory and encoding it into an Add message.
Joining a group
A client joining the group processes Welcome and Add messages by
preparing a new GroupState object based on the Welcome message, and
processing the Add message as an existing member would.
An existing member receiving an Add message verifies the signature of
the message, then updates its state as follows:
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Figure 4.11: The ratchet tree after adding the new client E to a group.
1. if index is equal to the size of the group, increment the group size and
extend tree accordingly;
2. verify the signature of the included UserInitKey. If the verification
fails, abort;
3. generate a WelcomeInfo object that describes the state prior to the
addition, and verify that the hash is the same as welcome info hash;
4. update the ratchet tree by setting all the nodes in the direct path of
the new node to blank;
5. set the leaf node at position index to a new node containing the public
key from the UserInitKey in the Add corresponding to the ciphersuite
in use, as well as the credential under which the UserInitKey was
signed.
The update secret resulting from this change is an all-zero octet string
of length Hash.length. Right after processing the Add message, the new
member should send an Update message in order to update its key. This will
help to limit the tree structure degrading into subtrees, and thus maintain
efficiency.
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4.11.3 Update
A member can send an Update message in order to update its leaf secret
and key pair. This provides Post-Compromise Security on the prior leaf
private key of the member.
Listing 4.13: Definition of Update message.
1 struct {
2 DirectPath path;
3 } Update;
The sender creates a message by generating a fresh leaf key pair and
computing the direct path in the ratchet tree. A member that receives an
Update message verifies the signature of the message, then updates its state
by updating the cached ratchet tree. This is made possible by replacing nodes
in the direct path from the updated leaf, using the information contained in
the Update message. If the tree contains blank nodes, the resolution of the
direct path will be used instead.
The update secret resulting from this change is the path secret for the
root node of the ratchet tree.
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Figure 4.12: The ratchet tree after updating the client D. Direct path is
represented in black, copath is represented in gray.
An open issue here is that, when a user is added to a group conversation,
they have to wait until each member performs an Update in order to get the
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complete knowledge of the group participants.
4.11.4 Remove
A Remove message is sent from a group member who wants to remove
one or more members from the group conversation. Remove messages are
not intended to be used when a member wants to remove themselves from
the group. In this case, when a member receives a Remove message where
the removed index is equal to the signer index, the recipient must discard
the message because it is malformed.
Listing 4.14: Definition of Remove message.
1 struct {
2 uint32 removed;
3 DirectPath path;
4 } Remove;
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Figure 4.13: The ratchet tree after removing the client D. Blank nodes are
represented with dashed outline. Copath is represented in gray.
Remove message is generated by the sender creating a fresh leaf key pair
and computing its direct path in the current ratchet tree, starting from the
removed leaf. A member that receives a Remove message verifies the signa-
ture of the message, then it updates its state as follows:
1. update the roster by setting the credential in the removed slot to null;
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2. update the ratchet tree, replacing nodes in the direct path from the
removed leaf using the information contained in the Remove message;
3. reduce the size of the roster and the tree until the rightmost element
and leaf node are non-null;
4. update the ratchet tree by setting to blank all nodes in the direct path
of the removed leaf, together with the root node. We assume here
that there must be at least one non-null element in the tree, since any
GroupState must have the current member in the tree and self-removal
is prohibited;
5. truncate the tree, so the rightmost non-blank leaf is the last node of
the tree.
The update secret will be the path secret for the root node of the ratchet
tree in the first step.
4.12 Sequencing of state changes
Each handshake message is based on a given starting state called epoch,
represented in Figure 4.14 and indicated with the prior epoch field. Any
changes to the state made from a different state will generate incorrect re-
sults.
Alice creates group Bob joins Charlie joins Bob leaves
Epoch 1
Secret 1
Epoch 2
Secret 2
Epoch 3
Secret 3
Epoch 4
Secret 4
time
Figure 4.14: Graphical representation of epochs
Sequencing changes are not a problem as long as any handshake message
is based on the latest state of the group. However, there is the risk that two
members will generate handshake messages based on the same state. In this
case, members of a group should deconflict the simultaneous handshakes.
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MLS specifies two approaches: the Delivery Service that enforces a total
order, or a signal in the message that clients can use to break ties.
As long as handshakes cannot be merged, there is a risk of starvation:
in a busy group, a member may never be able to send handshakes because
they always lose to other members. Handling this problem depends on the
dynamics of the application.
With both approaches, implementations must update the cryptographic
state only when a valid handshake message is received. Generation of hand-
shakes must be stateless, because the endpoint does not know at that time
if the changes to the state will succeed or not.
4.12.1 Server-enforced ordering
With server-enforced ordering, the delivery service keeps a queue for every
incoming message. This way, outgoing messages are processed in the same
order. The server is entitled to resolve conflicts during race conditions and
it is trusted, since it does not know the content of the messages.
Messages should have a clear-text counter that can be checked by the
server for tie-breaking. Counter starts from zero and is incremented for
every new message. If two members send a message with the same counter,
the first one to arrive will be accepted by the server, and the second one will
be rejected. The rejected message needs to be sent again with the correct
counter.
To prevent manipulation, the integrity of the counter can be guaranteed
by including the counter in a signed message envelope.
4.12.2 Client-enforced ordering
Order enforcement can be implemented client-side by using a two step
update protocol. The first client sends a proposal to update, which is ac-
cepted only when it gets more than 50% of approval from the group. Then, it
sends the approved update. Clients that do not get their proposal accepted
will wait for the winner to send their update before retrying new proposals.
This approach seems to be safer, as it does not rely on the server. Nev-
ertheless, it is more complex and harder to implement, and it can also cause
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starvation for clients that keep failing to get their proposal accepted.
4.12.3 Merging updates
A X C D
KDF(X) KDF(D)
KDF(KDF(X))
X B Y D
KDF(X) KDF(Y)
KDF(KDF(Y))
(a) - Update from B (b) - Update from C
A X Y D
KDF(X) KDF(Y)
KDF(KDF(Y))
(c) - Final tree
Figure 4.15: Merging two simultaneous updates from B and C
It is possible to address the problem of concurrent changes by having the
recipients of the changes merge them. Since the value of intermediate nodes
is determined by its last updated child, updates can be merged by recipients
as long as the recipients agree on an order.
As previously mentioned, processing an update is made in two steps:
compute updated secrets by hashing up the tree, and update the tree with
new secret and public values. To merge an ordered list of updates, a recipient
simply performs these updates in the specified order.
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If we consider the tree represented in Figure 4.7 (a) and we suppose that
both B and C simultaneously decide to update to X and Y, then they will
send out updates as represented in Figure 4.15 (a) (b).
Assuming that the ordering agreed by the group says that the update
from B should be processed before the update from C, the other members in
the group will overwrite the root value for B with the root value from C, all
resulting in the state represented in Figure 4.15 (c).
While Handshake messages should be ordered, Update messages do not
have to be ordered.
4.13 Application messages
The handshake protocol provides an authenticated group key exchange
to clients. The Application secret provided by the Handshake key schedule is
used to derive encryption keys for the Message Protection Layer. Application
messages must be protected with the AEAD encryption scheme associated
with the ciphersuite used.
Each member maintains their own chain of Application secrets, where the
first one is derived based on a secret chained to the Epoch secret. The initial
Application secret is bound to the identity of each client, in order to avoid
collisions and allow support for decryption of reordered messages.
Subsequent secrets must be rotated for each message sent in order to pro-
vide stronger cryptographic security guarantees. Application Key Schedule
uses this rotation to generate fresh AEAD keys and nonces used to encrypt
and decrypt future Application messages.
Each change to the Group through handshakes will cause a change of the
group secret: this means that changes must be applied before encrypting new
Application messages. This is needed for confidentiality, in order to avoid
receiving messages from the former group members after leaving, being added
to or excluded from the group.
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4.13.1 Message encryption and decryption
Group members must use the AEAD algorithm associated with the nego-
tiated MLS ciphersuite, in order to encrypt and decrypt Application messages
according to the Message Framing section.
The group identifier and epoch allow a device to know which group secrets
should be used and from which Epoch secret to start computing other secrets
and keys. The sender identifier is used to derive the Application secret chain
of the member from the initial group Application secret. The application
generation field is used to determine which Application secret should be
used from the chain to compute the correct AEAD keys before performing
decryption.
Application messages should be padded to provide resistance against traf-
fic analysis techniques. This avoids additional information to be provided to
an attacker in order to guess the length of the encrypted message.
Padding should be used on messages with zero-valued bytes before AEAD
encryption. Upon decryption, the length field of plaintext is used to compute
the number of bytes to be removed from the plaintext to get the correct data.
Delayed and reordered Application messages
Each Application message contains the group identifier, the epoch and
a message counter. This way, a client can receive messages out of order.
However, if they can retrieve or recompute the correct AEAD decryption
key, they can decrypt messages.
Clients might be required to keep the AEAD key and nonce for a cer-
tain amount of time to retain the ability to decrypt delayed or out of order
messages.
4.14 Security considerations
This section describes how security goals of MLS, previously described in
the architectural part, are achieved at protocol level.
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4.14.1 Confidentiality of the group secrets
Group secrets are derived from the previous ones and the root key of
a ratcheting tree. The root key of the group ratcheting tree, and all the
values derived from it, are secret because only group members know their
leaf private key in the group.
Initial leaf keys are known only by their owner and the group creator,
because they are derived from an authenticated key exchange protocol. Sub-
sequent leaf keys are known only by their owner. Long term identity keys
must be distributed by the Authentication Service to clients in order to au-
thenticate their legitimate peers.
4.14.2 Authentication
MLS considers two forms of authentication:
Authentication with respect to the group. Group members can verify
a message coming from one member of the group. This is guaranteed
by the secrecy of the shared key derived from the ratchet trees. If all
members are honest, then the shared group key is only known to the
group members. Further guarantees about the sender of a message take
place by using AEAD or appropriate MAC with the shared key.
Authentication with respect to the sender. Group members can ver-
ify that a message was sent from a particular member of the group.
This is guaranteed by digital signatures on the messages.
4.14.3 Init key reuse
Initialization keys are intended to be used only once and then deleted.
Reuse of initial keys is not unsafe at all, but it may complicate protocol
analyses, because it is difficult to know how many times the initial key was
used.
Chapter 5
An Implementation of MLS:
Melissa
5.1 Melissa
Melissa is a proof-of-concept implementation of the Messaging Layer
Security protocol created by the Wire team. It is written in Rust and it is
based on the draft 05 version of the protocol. The development started in
September 2018 and the code is publicly available open source at https:
//github.com/wireapp/melissa. In order to stick to the changes expected
from the specification of MLS, new updates are implemented accordingly.
Melissa is released under the terms of the GNU General Public License.
5.1.1 Work brought on Melissa
My contribution to Melissa included the update of the project to adapt
it to the draft 04 and 05 versions of the protocol. These changes include:
• updating the terminology used for variables and functions;
• replacing the hash inside TreeKEM with KDF;
• removing the secret field from the tree nodes;
• adding credentials to the tree and removing the roster at the same
time;
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• converting from states to commitment using tree hashes;
• adding framing for handshake and application messages, together with
encryption of handshake messages.
5.1.2 Rust
Rust is a compiled, multi-purpose programming language focused on
memory safety and concurrency. It aims to be an efficient, safe and suit-
able language for developing concurrent software.
Rust syntax is influenced by Cyclone, a safe dialect of C, with aspects
of object-oriented features from C++ and functional features from Haskell
and OCaml. This makes Rust a procedural, functional and object-oriented
programming language.
Rust is a language whose popularity has grown in recent years, so much so
that it is considered the ”most loved programming language” by developers
since 2016 according to the Stack Overflow Developer Survey [21]. Rust is
also used as the programming language of Servo, an experimental browser
engine that inspired some of the major improvements brought by Firefox
Quantum.
5.2 The project
The project can be cloned or downloaded from the GitHub repository.
The only requirements are that Rust must be installed on the system - this
can be done via rustup, the official Rust installer available at https://
rustup.rs - and that the package manager should update the dependencies
needed by the project. This can be done by calling cargo update in the
terminal from the root folder of the project.
5.3 Project structure
The project is structured in modules, declared inside the lib.rs file to-
gether with the dependencies. Modules are public and they are implemented
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inside their respective files: for example, treemath module is declared inside
the treemath.rs file.
melissa
aesgcm
crypto
groupcodec keys
messages tree treemath
utils
hkdf
hpke schedule
Figure 5.1: Modules available in Melissa
5.3.1 The crypto submodule
The crypto folder is a submodule of the project that contains all the
cryptographic modules used in Melissa.
aesgcm contains the functions for using the AES-128 and AES-256 block
cipher algorithms. In fact, the three structures available here are Nonce,
Aes128Key and Aes256Key. AES keys implement the From and Drop traits -
the main abstraction construct of Rust, equivalent in some way to Java inter-
faces - respectively the converter from u8 vectors and the destructor. They
also specify functions to seal (encrypt) and open (decrypt) data. AES-128
seals and opens data by using the seal in place() and open in place()
primitives of ring. AES-256 methods are currently left unused, since the
two ciphersuites specify AES-128 as the encryption algorithm.
hpke handles the Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE). A payload
can be encrypted through HPKE by calling the encrypt method on the
HpkeCiphertext object. The payload will be sealed with a fresh key pair
by using the ciphersuite composed by X25519, SHA-256 and AES-128-GCM.
Ciphersuites are specified by the HpkeCiphersuite enumerator and four of
them are declared, mostly for future implementations (e.g. with P256):
• P256, SHA-256 and AES-128-GCM;
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• P512, SHA-512 and AES-256-GCM;
• X25519, SHA-256 and AES-128-GCM;
• X448, SHA-512 and AES-256-GCM.
Messages can also be encrypted with a specified ephemeral key pair by
calling encrypt with ephemeral(). Both encryption and decryption proce-
dures call setup base x25519 aes 128() and setup core x25519 aes 128(),
that first creates a HpkeContext containing information like the ciphersuite
in use, then it expands both key and nonce through HKDF by using the hkdf
module. Since HPKE makes use of AES algorithms, ciphertexts are sealed
and opened by using the aesgcm module seen before.
hkdf handles the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Func-
tion (HKDF) [12], already seen in Chapter 4.8. HKDF is useful to hide the
input keying material from malicious attackers that may have some partial
knowledge about it.
When calling HKDF, it takes four arguments in input: salt, input, info
and length:
1 pub fn hkdf(salt: Salt, input: Input, info: Info, Len(len): Len) ->
Key {
2 Key(expand(extract(salt, input), info, len as usize))
3 }
The extract() function takes the input keying material to concentrate
dispersed entropy into a short but cryptographically strong pseudorandom
key (PRK) that is produced as the output of the function:
1 pub fn extract(Salt(s): Salt, Input(i): Input) -> Prk {
2 Prk(hmacsha256::authenticate(i, &hmacsha256::Key(mk_salt(s))).0)
3 }
Then, the generated output key is expanded to create a larger crypto-
graphically independent output. The number and length of the output keys
may depend on the algorithm used.
1 pub fn expand(prk: Prk, Info(info): Info, len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
2 let n = (len as f32 / HASH_LEN as f32).ceil() as usize;
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3 let mut t = Vec::new();
4 let mut okm = Vec::new();
5
6 for i in 1..=n {
7 let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(t.len() + info.len() + 1);
8 buf.extend(&t);
9 buf.extend(info);
10 buf.push(i as u8);
11
12 let key = hmacsha256::Key::from_slice(&prk.0).unwrap();
13 let t_i = hmacsha256::authenticate(&buf, &key);
14 okm.extend(&t_i.0);
15
16 t.clear();
17 t.extend(&t_i.0);
18 }
19
20 okm.into_iter().take(len).collect()
21 }
schedule contains functions and structures for the key schedule. Partic-
ularly, it includes the declaration of the Init Secret, the Epoch Secrets and
HKDF Label objects. It also comprehends the function to derive secrets:
given a pseudorandom key secret, a HKDF Label and a context, the secret is
derived by calling expand(secret, label, context) of the HKDF module.
Listing 5.1: Deriving secrets in the schedule module
1 pub fn derive_secret(secret: hkdf::Prk, label: &str, context: &[u8
]) -> Vec<u8> {
2 let context_hash = sha256::hash(context).0;
3 let hkdf_label = HkdfLabel::new(&context_hash, label,
HASH_LENGTH);
4 let state = &hkdf_label.serialize();
5 println!("HKDFLabel: {}", bytes_to_hex(&state));
6 let info = hkdf::Info(state);
7 hkdf::expand(secret, info, HASH_LENGTH)
8 }
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5.3.2 Group handling (group.rs)
The group module contains the core logic for managing a group in MLS.
The module handles the initialization of the group, the creation and process-
ing of the Welcome, Add, Update, Remove, Handshake messages, and deals
with init and epoch secrets. After processing every type of message, the
epoch secret gets updated by calling the rotate epoch secret() method.
This ensures Perfect Forward Secrecy.
Groups can be created starting from a Welcome message or initialized
through a Credential object and a GroupId. In the first case, the tree is
generated from the public keys, while in the latter it is generated starting
from the client’s own leaf.
The Add message is created at the same time of the Welcome message, as
illustrated in Figure 4.2. The Add message is created by encrypting the tree
with the new index of the member and the new size, together with a fresh
random leaf secret. As seen before, the new size is the number of leaves plus
one, while the expected index will be the number of leaves multiplied by 2.
Alongside, the Welcome message is created by processing the Add message
on a mutable copy of the current group.
The Update message is created by encrypting the own leaf index, the
current size of the tree and a fresh random leaf secret. Then, the message
is hashed and the secret gets updated. The Update is processed by checking
that hashes match: in this case, it merges the direct path with the hashed
nodes. Otherwise, KEM is applied to the Update path.
The Remove message is created by passing the index of the participant
that should be removed, together with the nodes and ciphertext encrypted
from the tree. The Remove is processed by applying the KEM path to the
path specified by the Remove message.
Handshake messages are created by passing the prior epoch, the index of
the signer and the algorithm used. After that, the message gets signed. Hand-
shakes are processed by verifying the signature and continuing the processing
by calling the proper process function described before and associated to
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the respective group operation value (add, update or remove).
New epoch secrets are generated by encoding the group identifier, the
group epoch, the tree and the transcript, and by updating the Init secret.
The group epoch is then incremented by 1.
5.3.3 Keys handling (keys.rs)
keys provide data structures and utilities for key handling. Particularly,
the module implements the structures for key agreement over the two curves
supported by the protocol, that is, Curve25519 and P-256. The latter is
implemented through its public key. For Curve25519, the public and pri-
vate keys are stored into a X25519KeyPair object, respectively encoded as
X25519PublicKey and X25519PrivateKey types. Key pairs can be gener-
ated from scratch, starting from an existing secret or from a private key.
Private keys can generate shared secrets and derive the public key by calling
the two methods shared secret() and derive public key():
1 pub fn shared_secret(&self, p: &X25519PublicKey) -> Result<[u8;
32], Zero> {
2 let group_element = scalarmult::curve25519::GroupElement::
from_slice(&p.0).unwrap();
3 let scalar = scalarmult::curve25519::Scalar::from_slice(&self.0)
.unwrap();
4 scalarmult::curve25519::scalarmult(&scalar, &group_element)
5 .map(|ge| ge.0)
6 .map_err(|()| Zero {})
7 }
8
9 pub fn derive_public_key(&self) -> X25519PublicKey {
10 let scalar = scalarmult::curve25519::Scalar::from_slice(&self.0)
.unwrap();
11 X25519PublicKey(scalarmult::curve25519::scalarmult_base(&scalar)
.0)
12 }
Furthermore, the keys module provides the Identity object that can
be used for identity keys. It exposes the identifier and the public key, thus
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maintaining the private key. Objects can be signed with a given Identity
by implementing the Signable trait, that provides the sign() method to
perform the signing action and verify() to ensure that the object is signed
correctly.
BasicCredential is the base structure for credentials that includes a
public key, together with an identity. Credentials can be verified through the
verify() method.
In the end, keys provides the mechanism for group initialization and
adding members to a group, through the UserInitKey object. The personal
UserInitKey is usually pushed to the Directory through the UserInitKeyBundle,
that includes the initialization key and a set of private keys that can be used
in the future by other clients, as described in Figure 4.1.
5.3.4 Encoding and decoding (codec.rs)
The codec module provides traits for encoding and decoding primitive
data types and custom data structures, in a similar fashion as TLS does. En-
coding and decoding is provided to submodules by implementing the Codec
trait. Codec makes available two methods for encoding and decoding, plus
two detached method versions that perform the respective operations on a
specified instance of the object:
Listing 5.2: The Codec trait
1 pub trait Codec: Sized {
2 fn encode(&self, buffer: &mut Vec<u8>);
3 fn decode(&mut Cursor) -> Result<Self, CodecError>;
4 fn encode_detached(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
5 let mut buffer = vec![];
6 self.encode(&mut buffer);
7 buffer
8 }
9 fn decode_detached(buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, CodecError> {
10 let mut cursor = Cursor::new(buffer);
11 Self::decode(&mut cursor)
12 }
13 }
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Implementations of the Codec trait are available throughout the project.
An example implemented for the HpkeContext object is available in Ap-
pendix A.1.
The codec module also provides implementations of the encode() and
decode() methods for the primitive unsigned integer types u8, u16, u32,
u64, besides respective encoding and decoding methods for unsigned integer
vectors, named respectively encode vec uXY and decode vec uXY (where XY
is the size of the unsigned type).
5.3.5 Messages specification and protection (messages.rs
and mp.rs)
The messages module declares the four main types of operations: Wel-
come, Add, Update, Remove, together with the enclosing Handshake message.
The core structure here is GroupOperation: it contains the type of message,
declared as a GroupOperationType enumerator, the content of the group op-
eration to be performed, declared inside GroupOperationValue, and the de-
livery confirmation. The GroupOperation is then enclosed into a Handshake
message. The structure of these messages follows the specifications brought
by the protocol described inside Chapter 4.11, with some minor adaptations.
The module also contains the structures for the message framing, such as
MLSPlaintext and MLSCiphertext. Message framing was introduced with
draft 05 and is described in Chapter 4.10.
The mp module is about message protection and provides structures like
ApplicationMessage that wrap the encrypted content of a message, and
SignatureContent that contains the signed content. It also includes struc-
tures for stage secrets (nonce and key) like StageSecrets and SenderApplicationSecret.
5.3.6 Tree structure and math (tree.rs and treemath.rs)
The tree module contains declarations of the main components of a tree:
nodes, node secrets and the tree itself.
The Node object represents an instance of a node in the tree. As reported
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in Chapter 4.2.1, the structure contains three optional values: a NodeSecret
object, a Diffie-Hellman public key and a private key. Fields are valued
based on their position in the tree, whether they are leaves, a direct path or
standard nodes. If no fields are valued, the node is considered blank. The
NodeSecret can be created randomly, starting from bytes, or hashed.
The Tree object describes the structure of a ratchet tree. It is basically
a set of Node objects, together with the index of its own leaf. Trees can
be created starting with the own leaf node or from a set of public keys,
together with the own leaf index and private key. Besides implementing
utility methods such as getting own leaf node, leaf count or the root node,
the object also provides operations that can be performed on the tree for
encryption and decryption purposes. They include:
• resolve(), that recursively resolves the tree as explained in Chapter
4.2.2 and illustrated below:
Listing 5.3: Resolution of a tree for a given node
1 pub fn resolve(&self, x: usize) -> Vec<usize> {
2 let n = self.get_leaf_count();
3 if !self.nodes[x].is_blank() {
4 return vec![x];
5 }
6
7 if treemath::level(x) == 0 {
8 return vec![];
9 }
10
11 let mut left = self.resolve(treemath::left(x));
12 let right = self.resolve(treemath::right(x, n));
13 left.extend(right);
14 left
15 }
• blank up() blanks the nodes of the tree recursively from the leaves up
to the root, excluding it;
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• merge() merges a set of nodes on a given path;
• hash up() returns the hashes for nodes on the direct path on a index
leaf node;
• kem to() applies the key encapsulation to the tree, given the set of
nodes composing direct path and the copath. The encapsulation is
made by encrypting the public key of a copath node with the secret of
the direct path node for every direct-copath node pair, this way:
1 let (dirpath_node, copath_node) = node_pair;
2 let public_key = copath_node.dh_public_key.unwrap();
3 let ciphertext =
4 HpkeCiphertext::encrypt(&public_key, &dirpath_node.secret.
unwrap().0[..]).unwrap();
5 path.push(ciphertext);
• encrypt() and decrypt() respectively for encrypting and decrypting
the tree;
• apply kem path() applies the key encapsulation to a given path.
The module also provides data structures for tree hashes, introduced by
draft 05 and previously explained in Chapter 4.5.
The treemath module contains utility methods for handling trees, like
finding the left or right children, parent, siblings, etc. More precisely:
• log2() for calculating base 2 logarithm (log2(n)) and pow2() for a
power of 2 (2n);
• node level and width;
• methods for relationships in a tree: root of a tree, left and right children,
parents and siblings;
• methods for calculating the direct path and copath;
• leaves() for the list of leaves in a tree.
The module also provides utility methods to generate and read test vec-
tors, that will be covered in the next chapter.
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5.3.7 Utilities (utils.rs)
The utils module provides some utility methods to convert hexadecimal
strings to bytes and vice versa, in addition to the call to the memzero()
method provided by sodiumoxide to clear vectors.
5.4 Dependencies
Dependencies in Rust are called crates and they are handled through
Cargo, the main package manager for Rust. Information about the cur-
rent package and dependencies are specified through the Cargo.toml file,
positioned inside the root directory. Another file, Cargo.lock, is gener-
ated automatically by Cargo starting from the Cargo.toml file while in-
stalling or updating crates and specifies exact information about dependen-
cies. Cargo.toml specifies:
• name, version and authors of the current package;
• general dependencies: sodiumoxide, libsodium and ring;
• dependencies for testing and benchmarking: criterion;
• the position of the benchmark folder.
5.4.1 NaCl, libsodium and sodiumoxide
sodiumoxide is a type-safe and efficient Rust binding around Sodium
(libsodium), which in turn is a portable, cross-compilable and packageable
fork of NaCl. NaCl, abbreviation for Networking and Cryptographic Library
and pronounced as ”salt”, is a public domain library for network commu-
nication, encryption, decryption and signatures. NaCl provides all the core
operations needed to build higher level cryptographic tools. [22] It was cre-
ated by Daniel J. Bernstein, mathematician and cryptologist who also created
Curve25519.
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5.4.2 ring
ring is another hybrid Rust, C and assembly library that provides a set of
general-purpose cryptographic operations. ring makes it easy to build and
integrate it into high level frameworks and applications; it also works opti-
mally on small devices and microcontrollers, in order to support Internet-of-
Things applications. ring derives from BoringSSL, which in turn is derived
from OpenSSL, it is developed by Brian Smith and available open source at
https://github.com/briansmith/ring. ring is used within the project to
provide AES-128-GCM, which is not provided by default by libsodium.
5.4.3 Usage within Melissa
NaCl is used in Melissa for several operations, including:
• Cryptographic random bytes generation for nonces, keys and key
pair generation within the whole project;
• Public-key signatures inside keys.rs using Ed25519, a EdDSA sig-
nature scheme that makes use of SHA-512 and Curve25519;
• Secret-key authentication inside the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-
Expand functions of hkdf.rs;
• Hashing to generate SHA-256 hashes for the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-
Expand functions, the derive secret function of schedule.rs and the
specification of the ciphersuite that includes SHA-256 inside of keys.rs;
• Scalar multiplication used to generate shared secrets, Derive-Public-
Key function, and new X25519 key pairs inside of keys.rs.
ring is mostly used in aesgcm.rs to provide Authentication Encryption
with Associated Data (AEAD) for sealing and opening keys, and for sealing
and opening operations.

Chapter 6
Melissa: Tests and Benchmarks
6.1 Tests
As a strategic component of any software, tests help to verify the cor-
rectness of instructions, procedures and functions of the entire software or a
particular module of it. Verification is typically specified through dedicated
test cases, functions that enclose various assertions that have to succeed in
order for the test to be verified.
There are four main levels of testing:
• unit tests that verify the functionality of a portion of code, usually
classes or single functions;
• integration tests that verify the interaction between different compo-
nents, classes or modules
• system tests that verify if a system meets its requirements;
• acceptance tests used to certify the readiness of a product before the
release, usually as part of a quality assurance system.
Tests can be natively supported by the system or may require the use
of external libraries for the whole task or some parts (e.g. usage of mock
objects).
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6.1.1 Tests in Rust
Within a Rust project, tests are declared inside each module. They are
recognizable by the #[test] attribute specified before each test method. On
larger projects, tests are usually grouped into a module called tests and
marked with the #[cfg(test)] attribute. [24]
Tests are verified through two main tools: panics and assertions. Panics
are usually placed inside the code where the functions should fail. In the
following example, a panic is thrown when dividing a number by zero:
1 pub fn divide(a: u32, b: u32) -> u32 {
2 if b == 0 {
3 panic!("Divide-by-zero error");
4 }
5 a / b
6 }
Assertions are placed inside the test cases to verify a particular condition.
If the assertion fails, a panic is thrown. The assertions available in Rust are
assert!(expression), that verifies the expression to be true, and both
assert eq!(left, right) and assert ne!(left, right), verifying that
the left item is equal or not to the right item.
Tests are handled through cargo and can be launched by calling cargo
test in the terminal.
6.2 Test cases
Test cases are available inside each module. They cover the main opera-
tions to be carried out within that module.
Encoding and decoding
We have seen that the codec module includes operations for encoding
and decoding data implementable through the Codec trait. Tests here verify
that:
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• primitive types, including unsigned integers u8, u16, u32 and u64 are
correctly encoded through the encode() function;
• vectors based on primitive types are correctly encoded through the re-
spective encode vec uXY function (where XY is the size of the unsigned
type).
An example of test with 16 bit unsigned integer primitive type and vector
can be found in Appendix A.2.1.
Sealing and opening in AES
The aesgcm module contains a test for sealing and opening a payload
encrypted through AES by using both AES-128 and AES-256 algorithms.
It basically seals a payload and opens it, to see that the two copies of the
message are the same:
1 let payload = vec![1, 2, 3];
2 let key: Aes128Key = Aes128Key::from(randombytes::randombytes(
AES128KEYBYTES));
3 let nonce = Nonce::new_random();
4 let encrypted = aes_128_seal(&payload, &key, &nonce).unwrap();
5 let decrypted = aes_128_open(&encrypted, &key, &nonce).unwrap();
6 assert_eq!(decrypted, payload);
HPKE
The hpke encrypt decrypt x25519 aes() test from the hpke module
is used for testing encryption and decryption through Hybrid Public Key
Encryption. It simply encrypts a cleartext composed by a vector of integer
with the public key, and decrypts it with the private key of a X25519KeyPair,
using a HpkeCiphertext object. Then, the cleartext and decrypted payloads
are compared.
1 #[test]
2 fn hpke_encrypt_decrypt_x25519_aes() {
3 let kp = X25519KeyPair::new_random();
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4 let cleartext = vec![0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
5
6 let encrypted = HpkeCiphertext::encrypt(&kp.public_key, &
cleartext).unwrap();
7 let decrypted = HpkeCiphertext::decrypt(&kp.private_key, &
encrypted).unwrap();
8
9 assert_eq!(cleartext, decrypted);
10 }
HKDF
Three tests are described into the hkdf module to verify the Extract-and-
Expand functions provided by HKDF. The tests declare the initial keying
material, the salt and the info that will be provided to the two functions,
and they verify the correctness by comparing the pseudorandom key for the
extract function, and the output keying material for the expand phase to the
expected values. test case 1() and text case 2() are basically the same
using keys of different lengths, where test case 3() verifies the functions
against empty salt and info values.
1 #[test]
2 fn test_case_1() {
3 use utils::*;
4
5 let ikm = hex_to_bytes("0
b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b");
6 let salt = hex_to_bytes("000102030405060708090a0b0c");
7 let info = hex_to_bytes("f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9");
8 let len = 42;
9
10 let expected_prk =
11 hex_to_bytes("077709362
c2e32df0ddc3f0dc47bba6390b6c73bb50f9c3122ec844ad7c2b3e5")
;
12 let expected_okm = hex_to_bytes(
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13 "3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d5
{...}85865",
14 );
15
16 let prk = extract(Salt(&salt), Input(&ikm));
17 let okm = expand(prk, Info(&info), len);
18
19 assert_eq!(&expected_prk, &prk.0);
20 assert_eq!(&expected_okm, &okm);
21 }
Group conversations
The group module contains a test named
alice bob charlie walk into a group(), which verifies the process of cre-
ating a group with three participants: Alice, Bob and Charlie.
More in depth, it creates a conversation with three identities, each of
them distinguished by a credential that includes the identity. Alice creates
the group with her identity, while Bob and Charlie create their UserInitKeys.
Then, Alice adds Bob to the group by creating a Welcome and Add message,
the latter being processed by Alice. In the end, Bob creates their represen-
tation of the group starting from the Welcome message from Alice.
After that, both Bob and Alice update their secret by creating an Update
message and processing it. Then, Bob adds Charlie to the group and pro-
cesses the Add message together with Alice. Charlie and Alice try to update
their secrets, which is updated by all the three participants.
Finally, Bob removes Charlie from the group, causing the remove message
being processed by all participants.
Keys
The keys module contains verification for crypto.bin test vector, to-
gether with a test that signs a payload and verifies it through the verify detached()
method. The module also tests the generation of UserInitKeys.
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Tree and tree math
The tests for tree and treemath modules are composed by the verifica-
tion of the test binaries dedicated respectively to tree resolution (resolution.bin)
and tree math (treemath.bin).
6.2.1 Test vectors
Test vectors are binary files released by the MLS Working Group that
are used to verify the compliance to the protocol. They are based on the
draft 04 version of the protocol and they are available in the MLS Implemen-
tations repository at https://github.com/mlswg/mls-implementations/
tree/master/test_vectors. Due to open issues on the protocol, there are
some minor differences between the specifications and the results of the vec-
tors.
Right now, there are six test vector files available covering the tree math,
tree resolution, cryptographic functions, key schedule, application key sched-
ule, message parsing and serialization and sessions. The three test vectors
currently available in the project and tested are treemath.bin, resolution.bin
and crypto.bin.
Tree math
The test vector for tree math aims to verify the relationships between
nodes, as defined in the protocol. This test vector is verified by the
verify binary test vector treemath() test inside the treemath module.
To do so, the vector is represented through a TreeMathTestVectors ob-
ject that contains the following values:
• tree size: the size of the tree to be tested;
• root[i]: index of the root of a tree with i+ 1 leaves;
• left[i], right[i], parent[i], sibling[i] : respectively, indices of
the left child, the right child, the parent and the sibling of the node at
the index i;
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The result of the respective function that should be called on the treemath
module has to be the same as the one declared in the vector.
Resolution
Resolution vectors verify the output of the tree resolution algorithm. This
test vector is verified by the verify binary test vector resolution() test
inside the tree module.
The vector is represented this way:
1 uint8_t Resolution<0..255>;
2 Resolution ResolutionCase<0..2^16-1>;
3
4 struct {
5 uint32_t n_leaves;
6 ResolutionCase cases<0..2^32-1>;
7 } ResolutionTestVectors;
The tree is distinguished by a number of leaves equal to n leaves. The
cases vector has 2(2×n leaves−1) entries; the entry at index t represents the
set of resolutions with a blank/filled pattern matching the bit pattern of the
integer t. When ((t >> n) & 1) == 1, the node n is filled, otherwise it is
blank.
The ResolutionCase vector contains the resolutions of every node in the
tree, so case[t][i] contains the resolution of the node i in the tree t.
Crypto
The test vectors about cryptographic features are declared through
CryptoTestVectors, the inputs of the functions, and CryptoCase that holds
the outputs using the specified ciphersuite. This test vector is verified by the
verify binary test vector crypto()) test inside the keys module.
The test vector is used to verify the correctness of the following methods:
• HKDF-Extract, the first step of Extract-and-Expand, over a given salt
and input keying material;
• Derive-Secret;
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Table 6.1: Code coverage results for Melissa
Module name Lines covered Percentage
crypto/aesgcm 95/101 94.06%
crypto/eckem 101/107 94.39%
crypto/hkdf 62/71 87.32%
crypto/schedule 55/69 79.71%
codec 140/178 78.65%
group 190/255 74.51%
keys 172/241 71.37%
messages 22/123 17.89%
mp 86/98 87.76%
roster 0/5 0%
tree 183/254 72.05%
treemath 150/180 83.33%
utils 13/13 100.00%
Total 1269/1695 74.87%
• Derive-Key-Pair;
• ECIES, using the key pair generated during Derive-Key-Pair.
6.2.2 Code coverage
Code coverage was implemented during this thesis work for testing pur-
poses. The component used here is Tarpaulin, a library for code coverage pur-
poses that provides line coverage, reporting tools and upload to online cover-
age services like Coveralls and Codecov. Due to its requirements, Tarpaulin
is compatible with Linux only, so it was run under a Ubuntu distribution.
Tarpaulin revealed that tests executed on the draft 04 version of the
project cover 74.87% of the entire codebase. More in depth, the results for
the single modules are listed in Table 6.1.
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6.3 Benchmarks
Benchmarks are tests that measure the performances of a software by
running the test code several times. The results of a benchmark can be used
to compare the performances with other softwares or solutions.
As previously seen, benchmarks are implemented inside Melissa through
the use of Criterion.rs, a benchmarking library created by Jorge Aparicio
and maintained by Brook Heisler, written in Rust and available open source
at https://github.com/bheisler/criterion.rs
Benchmark tests are declared inside the benches/benchmark.rs file. They
are written inside the criterion benchmark() function and they can be
launched by calling cargo bench inside the benches folder. These tests aim
to measure the performances of:
• HKDF Extract-and-Expand functions. The two functions are
performed in an average time of 20.19µs.
• encryption and decryption with ECKEM. The two operations are
performed in a similar time: encryption took an average of 239.53µs,
while decryption took 222.61µs;
• encryption and decryption with AES-128-GCM. Encryption took
an average of 9.24µs, while decryption took 2.85µs;
• creation of a UserInitKeys bundle. Bundle is created within an
average of 83.42µs;
• creation of a group with two members (Alice and Bob) and a larger
group of 10 members. Benchmarks revealed that group creation took
an average time of 3.13ms for a group with two participants (Figure
6.1) and 215.82ms for a group of 10 participants (Figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.1: Benchmark results for creating a group with two participants
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Figure 6.2: Benchmark results for creating a group with 10 participants
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Messaging is continuously evolving and will play an increasingly central
role in a constantly connected world. Security in communications will be
of primary importance in order to protect private conversations from third
parties, and the industry is increasingly moving in this direction.
Although end-to-end encryption has recently been implemented world-
wide in major messaging services, the focus on performance remains paramount.
In this context, Messaging Layer Security can play a fundamental role,
both for the unity of intent of the participants of the working group and their
companies, and for the intrinsic efficiency of the protocol that allows its use
on mobile devices and possibly embedded.
It will be interesting to follow the future of this protocol in several aspects,
first of all the transposition of the Internet Draft as IETF Standard, the
evolutions, the various implementations and finally the adoption by the major
players in the industry.
On a personal level, it was extremely interesting and compelling to follow
the various phases of the project, observing the first intentions of work on the
protocol, the decision of the name, and then go in depth during the recent
months through the analysis of the protocol and the work done on Melissa.
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Appendix A
Code examples
A.1 Implementation of the Codec trait
1 pub struct HpkeContext {
2 ciphersuite: u16,
3 mode: u8,
4 kem_context: Vec<u8>,
5 info: Vec<u8>,
6 }
7
8 impl Codec for HpkeContext {
9 fn encode(&self, buffer: &mut Vec<u8>) {
10 self.ciphersuite.encode(buffer);
11 self.mode.encode(buffer);
12 encode_vec_u8(buffer, &self.kem_context);
13 encode_vec_u8(buffer, &self.info);
14 }
15
16 fn decode(cursor: &mut Cursor) -> Result<Self, CodecError> {
17 let ciphersuite = u16::decode(cursor)?;
18 let mode = u8::decode(cursor)?;
19 let kem_context = decode_vec_u8(cursor)?;
20 let info = decode_vec_u8(cursor)?;
21 Ok(HpkeContext {
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22 ciphersuite,
23 mode,
24 kem_context,
25 info,
26 })
27 }
28 }
A.2 Tests
A.2.1 Encoding
1 #[test]
2 fn test_encode_primitives() {
3 // ...
4 let uint16: u16 = 1;
5 let mut buffer = Vec::new();
6 uint16.encode(&mut buffer);
7 assert_eq!(buffer, vec![0u8, 1u8]);
8 // ...
9 }
10
11 #[test]
12 fn test_encode_vec_u16() {
13 let v: Vec<u16> = vec![1, 2, 3];
14 let mut buffer = Vec::new();
15 encode_vec_u16(&mut buffer, &v);
16 assert_eq!(buffer, vec![0u8, 6u8, 0u8, 1u8, 0u8, 2u8, 0u8, 3u8])
;
17 }
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